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PREFACE 
«The questions, 'Is this means too hazardous or difficult to use' 
and 'does this measure only prolong the patient's dying,' while still 
useful and valid, now often become 'granted we can easily save the 
life, what kind of life are we saving?' This is a quality-of-life judgement. 
And we fear it. And certainly we should. But with increased power 
goes increased responsibility. Since we have the power, we must face 
the responsibility^1. These words of Richard A. McCormick, uttered 
more than twenty years ago, still ring sharply in the ears of ethicists 
and doctors today. «Quality of Life» remains a hotly contested issue 
that stands to mold further the vision of man, for it presupposes the 
value of the person for the subject himself, for his family and for 
society. How «Quality of Life» is understood will necessarily determi-
ne the limits of the duty to conserve life, in its nascent stages, through 
sickness or ill health, to its twilight in old age. What is at stake is 
shown by the ground that «Quality of Life» covers: it touches upon 
the meaning and definition of personhood; it raises the issue of the 
meaning and value of human suffering; it inquires into the nature of 
intention and the limits of freedom in the moral act; it forces one to 
consider the nature and limits of personal autonomy; and it touches 
upon the ontological and anthropological understanding of man. 
Being a question about man and the value of life, the central 
question becomes, should the «Quality of Life» of a human being be 
the central factor in the determination of the moral obligation to 
conserve or prolong its life? From other angles, the question appears: 
can criteria be formulated that would draw lines distinguishing those 
lives to be vigorously supported, from those lives which ought not 
be, through intentional act or omission?; can one withhold certain 
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life support means without necessarily harboring an intention of 
euthanasia? These questions are not only confined to hospitals and 
primary care clinics, but are encountered in civil courts and social 
planning, for upon its resolution relies the future of our way of life. 
For doctors and clinicians, jointly with families and ethics committees, 
wrestle with the difficult decisions to provide or not to provide life 
conserving means, a situation ever more common as medical technology 
advances. The courts find themselves arbiters of the difficult questions 
concerning personal autonomy in the ultimate decisions of life and 
death, while trying to maintain the state interest in promoting life, 
liberty and justice. Social planners, faced with the burgeoning demand 
for health care resources, grapple with «Quality of Life» questions in 
their attempts to justly and effectively allocate public means. Ethicists 
see turning points in the «Quality of Life» debate, as it lies at the heart 
of many profound changes in modern moral thinking, directly involving 
the issues of personhood, abortion and euthanasia. 
One such «Quality of Life» turning point consisted in the ethico-
legal resolution of abortion in most jurisdictions of the world. There 
is a move to similarly resolve the question of euthanasia in favor of its 
institutionalization or at least de-criminalization. The development 
of medical technology, and excesses in its application, have given rise 
to a certain backlash in favor of an autonomy that would allow one to 
escape the fate of therapeutic cruelty, if necessary, through assisted 
suicide or euthanasia. Thus there is a move to characterize such excesses 
as necessities, challenging us to discover the limits of human dignity 
as posited by the various ethical systems. 
Another «Quality of Life» turning point, especially considered in 
the consequentialist ethical system, asks: does human life bring with 
it automatically personhood? Many ethicists prefer to begin with the 
questions of humanhood and personhood, as points of departure for 
the determination of obligations for life conservation. In this approach, 
to be considered a person, one would have to possess certain minimal 
qualities. Where human life could be present, personhood could be 
something yet to be attained, or something definitively lost due to 
the permanent lack of key qualities. Instead of universally recognizing 
the ontological binomial of the human being-person unity, society 
would proceed to quality criteria for the concession of personhood. 
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For those who have attained such personhood, another «Quality 
of Life» turning point concerns the scope of personal autonomy. Many 
connect the «Quality of Life» ethic with the necessary autonomy to 
effect decisions regarding life and death decisions, according to a 
unique and personal set of values. Paul Ramsey noted this trend twenty 
years ago which has complicated the «Quality of Life» issue, that of 
the increasing acceptance of the notion of patient autonomy. He wrote: 
His freedom and dignity do not encompass the right 
to do wrong, a right to assault the value of his own life 
with medical assistance. Treatments are not electable 
because elected, desirable because desired. The translation 
'a patient's right to refuse treatment,' I fear, moves too far 
in the direction of subjective voluntarism and automated 
physicians. Having gone to that state of affairs in the 
matter of abortion, let us not do so as we approach medical 
euthanasia2. 
Thus, Ramsey indicates the stage in which the current debate takes 
place: infant and adult euthanasia, with virtual and actual triage, 3 
while the factors of autonomy and utilitarian concerns further 
complicate the issue. Is such autonomy, however, in the best interests 
of man and his personal dignity? 
Thus, discussions of «Quality of Life» themes eventually lead to 
discussions about the nature of man. Talk about man's life, especially 
his biological life, comes to clash with the notion of the patient as 
person, in the double unitary dimension of body and spirit. The notion 
of life as a gift and constitutive of the one existing subject conflicts 
with the notion of life as something that one has and can decide 
about in the most radical way: its voluntary continuation or 
termination. The question arises as to whether valors, especially in 
terms of life and its «Quality», are to be discovered by man's 
intelligence, or created by it. 
The ethical system of consequentialism abrogates precisely this 
creative role for man. Ethicists have looked to several other ethical 
systems to encapsulate the «Quality of Life» issue and its attendant 
questions for better expression and for elucidation of conclusions and 
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proposals. The other major systems proposed include natural law 
ethics, proportionalism, and Kantian deontological ethics. All these 
systems, taking up major anthropological assumptions, come to widely 
differing conclusions regarding the role of the intention in the moral 
assessment of acts, and the limits of mans personal freedom. Thus 
the current «Quality of Life» debate is presented in the light of the 
differing ethical systems which the authors assume in expounding 
their works. 
In the thesis, chapter one presents the «Sanctity of Life» ethic. 
While «Sanctity of Life» can be found in Eastern traditions, the par-
ticular Judeo-Christian formulation has had the most universal 
influence in bioethics, and that tradition is traced from its biblical 
roots through theological developments. For the Catholic holding, 
the major declarations of the Popes have given more particular form 
to its principles for use in bioethic cases, and in particular for this 
work, in the issue of «Quality of Life». 
Thus, after having reviewed the ethic of «Sanctity of Life», chapter 
two of the thesis presents many attempts to take hold of the equivocal 
concept of «Quality of Life»; and to clarify it for specific uses. Distinct 
«Quality of Life» measuring tools are presented, which are most often 
at the service of physicians both as descriptive aids in clinical discussion 
and as evaluative determinants in the development of new medical 
treatment. The concept of «Quality of Life» as normative, the major 
focus of this work, is presented by several authors. The entry of 
«Quality of Life» into sociology is likewise presented, for its use in 
health care rationing. The introduction of «Quality of Life» into law 
in the specific instances of certain end-of-life cases is explored, as well 
of those cases involving «wrongful life». 
After clarification of the concept of «Quality of Life», chapter three 
follows, briefly introducing the ethical systems which are employed 
in the «Quality of Life» question, while subsequently focussing on 
issues within Judeo-Christian quarters. This extract is taken, in its 
majority, from this third chapter, where the question of substantial 
«Quality of Life» criteria, as employed in a proportionalist ethic, is 
examined in the context of the Judeo-Christian principles and 
anthropology mentioned in the first chapter. Such substantial «Quality 
of Life» criteria are seen as a challenge to the long-held theological 
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approach to conserving human life. Other authors, particularly seeking 
to remain within magisterial parameters have, in application of these 
same, given rise to a major controversy over the «Quality of Life» 
question. They propose a spiritual function criteria. Much of this 
debate revolves around the correct interpretation of the received 
principles and pronouncements, in particular with reference to 
unconscious patients. Other related issues concern the resolution of 
concurrent pathology cases, the hermeneutic of benefits and burdens 
in determining proportionality, and the differentiation of medicine 
and care, all from the Judeo-Christian perspective. 
Once having covered Judeo-Christian perspectives of «Quality of 
Life», chapter four of the original thesis takes up the treatment of 
«Quality of Life» from the point of view of secular consequentialist 
ethics. The first points include the considerations of the requirement 
of minimum «Quality of Life» criteria for humanhood and personhood. 
Certain proposals are presented along with their attendant difficulties. 
The subsequent sections detail the central consequentialist approaches 
toward «Quality of Life», which include personalist «Quality of Life» 
determinations within full autonomy and a consequentialist valor 
calculus, as well as social utilitarian proposals for «Quality of Life» 
issues. A critique is then made of the consequentialist approach, while 
proposing arguments supporting the notions of life as an intrinsic good, 
limited autonomy as in consonance with that good, and the role of 
intention in «Quality of Life» judgements. 
Conclusions are drawn on the notion of normative «Quality of 
Life» in bioethics. Because of the equivocal nature of the term, 
precisions are made as to which nuances appear to be most appropriate. 
It is hoped that this thesis will serve to elucidate the extensive and 
complicated concept of «Quality of Life», as well as to be an aid in 
the Catholic exposition and resolution in favor of the «Sanctity of 
Life». The investigation begins with a challenge to be verified, that 
might be summed up again by Richard McCormick: «Briefly, if we 
must face the task of making quality-of-life judgements -and we must-
then we must face the difficult task of building criteria for these 
judgements))4. 
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I. PROPORTIONALITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE 
The question of «Quality of Life» is asked against the background 
of a «Sanctity of Life» ethic. Thus, the teaching of the Magisterium is 
presented to provide a basis for understanding the ethical changes 
proposed by those supporting a «Quality of Life» ethic. This doctrine 
is presented in terms of negative duties, (thou shalt not kill) and 
positive obligations to conserve one's life. This latter category has 
been most recently formulated in terms of proportionate and 
disproportionate means. This section presents the teaching, as well as 
objections and proposals. 
The Proportionality of Ordinary Means 
The most clear sources for the teaching on the obligation to con-
serve one's life are found in the discourses of Pius XII, and in the 
magisterial teachings under John Paul II. These more important 
statements are presented. 
a) Magisterial Teaching on Proportionate Means 
Pope Pius elaborated the right and obligation that one has in taking 
the necessary treatment in order to preserve one's life. One fulfills 
this duty before God, before one's community in social and even 
strict justice, and before one's family. However, he limited such a duty: 
But normally one is held to use only ordinary means — 
according to circumstances of persons, places, times, and 
culture— that is to say, means that do not involve any grave 
burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would 
be too burdensome for most men and would render the 
attainment or the higher, more important good too difficult. 
Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact subordinated to 
spiritual ends. On the other hand, one is not forbidden to 
take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life 
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and health, as long as he does not fail in a more serious duty 5. 
Within the Catholic heritage, the terminology ordinary, 
extraordinary, proportionate, disproportionate have been 
used to elucidate the obligation to conserve life. «Means» 
refer to the positive obligation that enjoins one to conserve 
human life. The obligation has been seen to bind, except in 
the case of moral impossibility. In pronouncing on this 
question, Pius XII (Allocution of November 24, 1957) 
clarified that this duty is relativized by what constitutes a 
excessive burden in a particular culture, place, time, etc., 
thus allowing for the coexistence in time of one means as 
ordinary and extraordinary depending on the place, and 
equally dichotomous but in different epoches. Also to be 
considered are the pertinent moral and physical resources of 
the particular patient and his family. This approach allows 
for an on-going development of means from extraordinary 
to ordinary —a concession to medical technology's positive 
effect on the lessening of the burdens of treatments and re-
medies. 
With the steady advance of medical technology and the attendant 
questions on its use, the magisterial document Declaration on 
Euthanasia, summarized much of the Catholic teaching on the 
«Sanctity of Life», while forbidding euthanasia. The Declaration on 
Euthanasia clarifies the definition of euthanasia for purposes of ethical 
treatment. It states: «By euthanasia is understood an action or omission 
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering 
may in this way be eliminated. Euthanasias terms of reference are to 
be found in the intention of the will and in the methods used»6. The 
document goes on to clearly denounce all acts that kill innocent human 
beings. This definition makes it clear that omissions that introduce a 
cause of death, as a directly intended effect, or as the only effect where 
a moral impossibility is not encountered, are to be counted as 
euthanasia. In developed analysis, the document, in the section on 
due proportion in the use of remedies, states the conditions under 
which omissions are not to be construed as euthanasia. It cites and 
develops the teaching confirmed by Pius XII: 
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In the past, moralists replied that one is never obliged to 
use «extraordinary» means. This reply, which as a principle 
still holds goods, is perhaps less clear today, by reason of the 
imprecision of the term and the rapid progress made in the 
treatment of sickness. Thus some people prefer to speak of 
«proportionate» and ((disproportionate* means. In any case, 
it will be possible to make a correct judgement as to the 
means by studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree 
of complexity or risk, its cost and the possibility of using it, 
and comparing these elements with the result that can be 
expected, taking into account the state of the sick person 
and his or her physical and moral resources. 
In order to facilitate the application of these general 
principles, the following clarifications can be added: 
—If there are no other sufficient remedies, it is permitted, 
with the patient's consent, to have recourse to the means 
provided by the most advanced medical techniques, even if 
these means are still at the experimental stage and are not 
without a certain risk. By accepting them, the patient can 
even show generosity in the service of humanity. 
—It is also permitted, with the patient's consent, to 
interrupt these means, where the results fall short of 
expectations. But for such a decision to be made, account 
will have to be taken of the reasonable wishes of the patient 
and the patient's family, as also of the advice of the doctors 
who are specially competent in the matter. The latter may 
in particular judge that the investment in instruments and 
personnel is disproportionate to the results foreseen; they 
may also judge that the techniques applied impose on the 
patient strain or suffering out of proportion with the benefits 
which he or she may gain from such techniques. 
—It is also permissible to make do with the normal means 
that medicine can offer. Therefore one can not impose on 
anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which 
is already in use but carries a risk or is burdensome. Such a 
refusal is not the equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it 
should be considered as an acceptance of the human 
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condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a medical 
procedure disproportionate to the results that can be 
expected, or a desire not to impose excessive expense on the 
family or the community. 
—When death is imminent in spite of the means used, it 
is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse forms 
of treatment that would only secure a precarious and 
burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care 
due to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted. In 
such cases the doctor has no reason to reproach himself with 
failing to help the person in danger7. 
In this lengthy citation, the Magisterium provides a coherent 
approach using the proportionality of means for deciding the extent 
of the obligation to conserve human life. While the patient s condition, 
both before and as projected after prospective treatment, is an 
important element in this decisionmaking, the primary focus is on 
the means to be applied, and not directly upon the »Quality of Life» 
as normative. Means that are proportionate offer hope of success and 
freedom from excessive burdens in keeping with the benefits sought, 
(and the side effects to be tolerated). 
b) Proportionality —Objections and Proposals 
This focus upon means and their proportionality, allows for 
advancement in medical technology to bring many means, once 
considered excessively burdensome in certain aspects (cost, pain, risk, 
etc) to be considered proportionate. Callahan, however, asks for a 
more critical assessment of the «progress» that medical advance 
provides.8 While claiming not to be anti-technologic, he opposes the 
process by which a means could become ordinary based solely on the 
burdensomeness of the application. He averts to the fact that while 
some technological advances ameliorate suffering due to old age and 
sickness, others may in effect prolong suffering. Thus appealing that 
«no one should have to die a worse death as a result of medical 
technology than would have been the case prior to that technology», 
he goes on to state: 
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If technology threatens to leave us worse off, and we 
nonetheless feel obliged to use it, we have indeed become its 
slaves.... Doctors should feel as great an anxiety that a patient 
will die a poor death from technological excess as the present 
anxiety that the patient will die because there is too little 
technology9. 
He then asks if new technology should be invented for the sole 
purpose of keeping people alive with a poor «Quality of Life», 
especially, for example, those with in a PVS: «If one believes that it is 
a good to be kept alive in a PVS state, does this not imply that further 
research should be carried out to make such a thing more possible — 
to keep those in that state alive longer and longer, even to a full 
lifetime?» 1 0The challenge is clear: should the process by which a means 
becomes ordinary be left untouched, or should it be governed by 
«Quality of Life» principles which seek the quality of life preserved? 
Catholic teaching introduces a relativizing standard, that directs 
toward the determination of the burdens of moral impossibility on a 
case by case basis, with the decisions to be taken in conscience. A 
difficulty with the «Quality of Life» standard, (or perhaps equally 
stated here, the «Quality of Death» standard) lies in fixing the 
operational criteria. Also, how is the better death to be determined? 
This suggests in practical terms, a rejection of the means approach as 
such, and the nature of this thinking leads necessarily to replacing the 
burden of means by the burden of life in the determination of what 
constitutes proportionate means. Thus, establishing the value of the 
lives of the permanently unconscious, that is human life that does 
not exhibit any rational or affective signs, becomes necessary. 
Lynn and Childress rightly point out that, in medical practice, 
some of the criteria implicit in the means debate are foreign, that is, 
not morally relevant in the determination of proportionality.11 But 
they conclude that «medical nutrition and hydration do not appear 
to be distinguishable, in any morally relevant way, from other life-
sustaining medical treatments that may on occasion be withheld or 
withdrawn* 1 2. This shift in common outlook toward the evaluation 
of the proportionality certain effective means for life itself will be 
dealt with in a separate section. 
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However, even the seemingly simple task of appraising reasons for 
withholding or withdrawing, —the usefulness of a given means (or 
its futility), is fraught with difficulty. Several authors emphasize that 
each aspect of this deliberation comes conditioned by ones previous 
stance on the value of life. Youngner states: «Physicians are in the best 
position to know the empirical facts about the many aspects of futility. 
I would argue, however, that all, except for physiological futility and 
an absolute inabi l i ty to postpone death, also involve value 
judgements))1 3. 
In the midst of this controversy over the validity of the means 
approach, Ramsey made a valiant effort to avoid the slipperiness of 
the «Quality of Life» terminology and approach, and to found the 
whole approach on an objective basis. For this he sought a foundation 
in the physiological understanding of futility: 
I suggest that the morally significant meaning of ordinary 
and extraordinary medical means can be reduced almost 
without remainder to two components. I further urge that 
the older language be abandoned, and that instead we should 
speak of (1) a comparison of treatments that are 'medically 
indicated' and expected to be helpful, and those that are not 
medically indicated. In the case of the dying, that in all ca-
ses, or in many cases, a judgement that further curative 
treatment is no longer indicated. Instead of the traditional 
language, still current among physicians, we should speak 
about (2) a patient's right to refuse treatment 1 4. 
Still Ramsey expressed misgivings about making such a change, 
admitting that, an advantage of the older terminology was that it 
directed the attention of the concerned parties toward the objective 
features of the patient's condition and the curative means, (even those 
previously be expressed in advance directives), rather than towards 
value judgements about the «Quality of Life». One of the pioneers in 
eschewing patient autonomy, 1 5 he warned against the unbounded use 
of such a concept that would attempt to empower subjective decisions 
with the creation of right and wrong, something the prior means 
approach could avoid. Ramsey intended that such considerations be 
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applicable only to dying patients. Here the difficulty arises in practice 
as determining who qualifies for this label. Furthermore, despite the 
well intentioned effort, it is not clear how this proposal would escape 
the critique of Youngner that points to inevitable «Quality of Life» 
elements. 
McCormick offers a newer version on determin ing the 
obligatoriness of treatments that are considered ordinary or 
proportionate in most situations. He prefaces this by also noting, 
correctly, a certain ambiguity in the term dying. For those with an 
illness that would prove fatal without treatment, he proposes a twofold 
determining criterion: «(1) a return to relatively normal health: (2) 
ultimate independence from the technology. It is these two features 
that constitute the notion of 'reasonable hope of benefit'*16. Thus, 
for a dialysis patient requiring on-going treatment, or for one with a 
pacemaker with an external power source, McCormick speaks of a 
grey area involving optional treatment. Equally to be deduced from 
this is that for a person that can be maintained, but not returned to 
anything approaching normal health, we also begin to view the 
treatment as inappropriate. Thus the «Quality of Life» to be preserved 
determines whether we view the patient as dying or not, as well as the 
moral obligation of the treatment. If the life is of poor quality, the 
means can be extraordinary, and we can judge it appropriate to 
withdraw or withhold the means and allow the «dying» process to 
run its course. McCormick charges that to decide independently of 
this criterion is to fall back on vitalism. 1 7 It is not clear, however, that 
the means approach, in its assessments of burdens inherent in the 
treatments themselves, does not offer a safeguard against unnecessary, 
useless or excessive treatment. Again, much turns on how one views 
the value of life of lesser quality. 
Quay intuits in McCormick an attempt to return a moral 
dimension to moral acts, yet questions the method: «But is it desirable 
to achieve this goal by turning the definition of the physiological 
deterioration, already at work, that dying is, into a value judgement 
about the utility of means?*1 8 
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c) Nuances —Artificial-Natural Means 
The distinction between artificial - natural frequently arises in 
considering the obligatoriness of means. The question is posed: does 
this distinction have moral content, that is, is it a factor in itself in 
determining whether a means is proportionate? Discussion of this 
distinction dates at least from the writings of Vitoria. A number of 
authors opine on the content of such a distinction; presented here are 
Kelly, Cronin, and McCormick. 
Kelly, writing in the early 1950s, introduced, for modern bioethics 
debate, the question itself of the natural - artificial distinction by 
examining the fittingness of certain means. He distinguished artifi-
cial means as remedies, and not obligatory unless offering a reasonable 
hope of checking or curing a disease, that is, spes salutis. Kelly sees 
remedies as supplanting natural functions: 
[A]nd on this basis, [to arrive at a prudent, human 
evaluation of the factors involved], all artificial means of 
sustaining life seem to be remedies. All of them are used 
because of some diseased or defective condition. I suggest, 
therefore, that any principle which is applicable to remedies 
as such is applicable to the use of any artificial means of 
preserving life 1 9. 
He continues to make it clear that the overriding principle in the 
determination of the obligatoriness of the means rests not with the 
determination natural or artificial, but with the evaluation of ordinary 
or extraordinary. It is not clear if Kelly wanted to distinguish nutrition 
and hydration administered artificially from «ordinary care» which 
he considered obligatory. 
Cronin, writing a few years after Kelly, took up certain historical 
aspects of the duties of conserving life, and within this context, singled 
out Vitoria for the beginnings of the natural - artificial distinction. 
While in Vitoria's time technological advances in medicine were only 
in their nascent stages, drugs and special diets were not unknown, 
and thus formed part of his inquiry, and he concluded: «There is no 
such similarity between a drug and food. For food is per se a means 
ordained for the life of the animal and is natural, not so however for 
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a drug.... Medicine per se is ordained by nature for health» 2 0. Cronin 
interpreted Vitoria as seeing food as basically and fundamentally necessary 
for the physical sustenance of the organism from its very beginning, 
required by all, and part of the order of nature. Because of this, man has 
a right to cultivate and procure food. Drugs are not needed in this same 
way, but are intended by nature per se for the conservation of life, by 
way of exception, when man is sick or in pain and unable to sustain 
himself with the ordinary means that nature provides. Were man never 
to fall ill, he would not need these remedies21. 
Thus Cronin resumed: 
To summarize Vitoria's teaching in this matter, we may 
say that natural means of conserving life are per se intended 
by nature as the means whereby man is to conserve his life 
and ordinarily these are strictly obligatory. Furthermore, ar-
tificial means of conserving life are perse intended by nature 
as a means whereby man can supplement the natural means 
of conserving life when these natural means are lacking or 
insufficient etc. Ordinarily, these artificial means are 
obligatory too if they can be obtained and used conveniently 
and with some certitude of benefit22. 
As Cronin noted, Vitoria introduced several considerations: that 
there is a difference between a natural means and an artificial means, 
but for the purpose of determining the obligations of their use, they 
fall under the same scrutiny as natural means; and while the distinction 
can be made, the artificial means are still seen as «intended by nature» 
for man's use; that artificial means can be considered as a supplement. 
While Cronin looks and studies the differences between natural 
and artificial means in themselves, McCormick, however, focuses on 
its administration and the attendant complication in order to maintain 
a distinction between means applied in an 'ordinary' fashion, and 
medical treatment ('artificial' feeding, such as nasogastric and 
gastrostomy tubes, or hyperalimentation) 2 3. He first raises a question: 
Does the simple fact that artificial feeding 'gives what all 
men need to live' imply that how it is given makes no 
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difference in its description? Most of us would not know 
how to go about providing nutrition and hydration by 
nasogastric tube and I.V. lines. These procedures require 
skilled medical training. Does that constitute them strictly 
medical procedures? This is an important issue because nor-
mal feeding has profound symbolic importance in human 
relationships and societal structure. It is one thing to starve 
the hungry. We should be appalled at the idea. It is quite 
another to withhold or withdraw a medical procedure. That 
we do routinely and justifiably2 4. 
This shows the complication of modern bioethics in that procedures 
which were once experimental, highly risky, and perhaps rather 
inefficacious, are now common, developed, and easier to provide. 
The point McCormick makes is that commonness or ubiquity of a 
means does not make it in itself «ordinary» and thus obligatory. These 
characteristics are not sufficient in themselves; while these means may 
be common in a hospital, they exceed the skill of the untrained, and 
bring with them risks. McCormick concludes that the qualification 
'artificial' can bring with it that of «treatment». This would lead to 
consider nutrition and hydration, for example, as a medical means 
subject to medical autonomy. This would also discount the claim 
made by others, that certain means always belong to «ordinary care», 
a care which ought not to be interrupted except in the case medical 
futility, since it is assumed proportionate from other aspects.2 5 
2. Normative Quality of Life 
Some authors have undertaken the task of formulating a definition 
of normative «Quality of Life» for bioethic discourse. While such 
definitions have their limitations, they do bring out the basic 
differences between a «Quality of Life» ethic and a «Sanctity of Life» 
ethic, and the underlying ethical theories used to support them. This 
extract examines the «Quality of Life» debate within Judeo-Christian 
circles, where the prevalent ethical theories are Natural Law ethics, 
Jewish Hallakah law, and Proportionalism. 
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a) Reich —Descriptive, Evaluative, Normative 
Reich proposed summary definitions of «Sanctity of Life» and 
«Quality of Life» ethics for the bioethic field, showing their underlying 
assumptions as revealing options for moral theories that are often 
found in sharp conflict: 
A quality of Life ethic can be defined as one that (1) 
depends on an ethical theory of consequentialism; (2) assigns 
relative and unequal value to human lives on the basis of the 
possible consequences of variable qualities; and (3) espouses 
the norm that the conservation and protection of human 
life are not required or do not carry an overriding obligation, 
unless the directly experienced qualities or the qualities 
expected to be experienced actually invest that life with 
sufficient value. 
In contrast, a sanctity-of-life ethic (1) typically depends 
on a deontological theory of ethics (though other moral 
theories can be used to support its norms); (2) assigns equal 
value to human lives regardless of their condition, usually 
on the basis of inherent values; (3) frequently presupposes 
the general moral orientation favoring a strong moral belief 
that human life should be treasured and respected; and (4) 
espouses the presumptive norm that human life ought to be 
sustained and protected and that life ought not to be taken 
without a very serious justification2 6. 
A «Sanctity-of-Life» ethic must respond to the challenges posed 
by new medical technology, principally if the proportionate means 
analysis can adequately address the difficult cases such as suffering 
deformed newborns and fetuses in terms of that same suffering, the 
suffering of the family, and the costs to society. A «Quality of Life» 
ethic, which claims to resolve these questions neatly, must defend 
itself against the charge that such clarity of action is not purchased at 
a price that erodes the very human values it attempts to safeguard. 
As mentioned, «Quality of Life» is an equivocal term, leading to 
many ambiguities. The usage for describing a patient's condition will 
not necessarily provide directly an ethical treatment option; likewise, 
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identifying «Qualities of Life» that are appealing to most men, does 
not serve to illuminate the present physiological condition of this 
patient, nor indicate to us his or her particular preferences. In order 
to shed light on usage, Reich, in an entry in the Encyclopedia of 
Bioethics, makes a threefold distinction for «Quality of Life»: namely, 
descriptive, evaluative and normative 2 7. 
He distinguishes «Quality of Life» as a descriptive statement when 
one «makes an observation about the presence or nature of a quality, 
characteristic, or property.... When used to describe a patient's present 
or future condition, the term 'quality of life' is morally neutral» 2 8. 
Clearly, in order to make rational, ethical medical decisions, one must 
take into account the condition of the patient. This does not necessarily 
imply a normative relation between that condition and the treatment 
decision. Disagreement thus often arises over terminology, with one 
party claiming that «Quality of Life» assessments must not be made, 
(taken in a normative sense), while another misconstrues this to mean 
that one must somehow make sensible medical decisions without 
evaluation of the medical condition of the patient («Quality of Life» 
taken in a descriptive sense). 
Reich continues with another distinction, the evaluative «Quality 
of Life»: 
An evaluative statement about quality of life indicates 
that some value or worth is attached to the characteristics of 
a given individual or to a kind of human life. This means 
that a quality of life is good or desirable or valuable. When a 
quality is valued in this way, the life may be appreciated, 
desired, or judged worth living as something sacred, beautiful 
or beneficial, but this does not necessarily imply that actions 
terminating or supporting life are right or wrong. Some call 
this a nonmoral value judgement. For example, one may 
value a physically mobile life; but the question remains 
unanswered as to what actions are permissible in reference 
to a life that is less than normally mobile. 2 9 
Much has been written on evaluative «Quality of Life», including 
such diverse points of view ranging from the positive valuation of 
QUALITY OF LIFE 209 
human suffering to the exaltation of a life that precludes any such 
suffering. Medicine has made great use of the evaluative «Quality of 
Life» concept, seeking advances in medicines and techniques to better 
the overall «Quality of Life» of persons. An example is a test designed 
for the efficacy of three anti-hypertensive drug therapies. A number 
of quality of life dimensions were chosen, thought to be affected by 
the drug treatment from their significant side effects: general well-
being, sleep dysfunction, sexual problems, work performance, social 
activity participation, physical stress, and cognitive function. Despite 
the quite comparable effectiveness of the three drugs tested, compa-
rable differences in the health-related quality of life were detected, 
giving a basis for differentiation of the treatment options. 3 0 
Finally, Reich presents his description of a statement of «Quality 
of Life» that is morally normative, one that «entails a moral judgement 
on valued qualities of life, which involve saying that certain norms 
indicate which attitudes toward or ways of treating human bodily life 
are morally good or bad, right or wrong. Quality of life has its real 
significance for bioethics, then, only when it is used in a morally 
normative judgement that states whether one ought to support and 
protect life on the basis of a perception of human qualities».3 1 
b) Walter, Shannon —Nuances in Normative 
Walter and Shannon provide a threefold division of normative 
«Quality of Life» for bioethic discourse.3 2 In this approach, three 
categories are made of patients with impaired «Quality of Life». The 
first involves those with a congenital or acquired condition of 
diminished «Quality of Life». Such a patient would be functional, 
the illness, non life threatening and manageable. The normative 
content requires proportionate means, and this situation is not rightly 
judged to be one where heavy ethical analysis needs to be invoked. 
No ethical or medical basis to withdraw or deny life support is 
indicated. The second group involves those with a diminished «Quality 
of Life» caused by a life threatening illness, or terminal condition. 
Here again the proportionate disproportionate means analysis is 
applied, and the question is thus rightly posed: should life support be 
begun or continued? The third group involves a combination of the 
preceding two: a diminished quality of life from a preexisting 
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condition, complicated by a different, life threatening, or terminal, 
illness. Here the proposal is that the normative analysis of the second 
group is modified in that the poor ((Quality of Life», which would 
render some treatments otherwise considered obligatory, as optional, 
based on the ability of the patient to continue to seek the spiritual 
purpose of life. The principle of proportionate benefit still applies, 
but it may be concluded that continued life in this poor ((Quality of 
Life» state may or may not a benefit, and one may allow the underlying 
fatal pathology to run its course in given situations. 
c) «Quality of Life» Definitions,—Needs,Wants 
In a survey of definitions as they have appeared in the literature, 
Johanna de Haes and Ferdinand van Knippenburg offer six versions 
of «Quality of Life»: 
a) Ability of patients to manage their lives as they evaluate 
it; b)the degree of need satisfaction within the physical, 
psychological, social activity, material and structural area; 
c)a function of the patients natural endowment, and the 
efforts made on his behalf by his family and by society; d)the 
global evaluation of the good or satisfactorily character of 
people's life; e)the totality of those goods, services, situations 
and states of affairs which are delineated as constituting the 
basic nature of human life and which are articulated as being 
needed and wanted; and f)the output of two aggregate 
factors: physical and spiritual 3 3. 
What is clear is that ((Quality of Life» must include all areas of life 
and experience. Hayry presents two approaches for quality of life 
definition: a needshzsis and a wants basis. The former is the subject of 
many measurement tools that see «Quality of Life» in the satisfaction 
of certain basic needs as mentioned previously, such as health, (or 
lack of disease), mobility, good physical performance, adequate 
nutrition and shelter, etc. The latter views ((Quality of Life» as being 
able to be improved by the fulfillment of the wants or personal goals 
of the individual 3 4. One such wants theory defines: 
A good quality of life can be said to be present when the 
hopes of an individual are matched and fulfilled by 
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experience. The opposite is also true: a poor quality of life 
occurs when the hopes do not meet with experience. Quality 
of life changes with time, and under normal circumstances 
can vary considerably. The priorities and goals of an indivi-
dual must be realistic and would therefore be expected to 
change with time and be modified by age and experience. 
To improve the quality of life therefore, it is necessary to try 
to narrow the gap between hopes and aspirations, and what 
really happens. A 'good' quality of life is therefore usually 
expressed in terms of satisfaction, contentment, happiness 
and fulfillment, and the ability to cope 3 5. 
The wants approach sees «Quality of Life» and its improvement 
then in this gap between the sought after, and the present possession. 
This clearly contrasts from the needs approach, which analyzes 
«Quality of Life» from the angle of the basic needs that all men require. 
There are some important assumptions explicit in the wants 
approach. It is multi-dimensional with regard to the individual's life. 
His or her aims and goals must be realistic. Furthermore, such an 
approach, if taken strictly, is irreconcilable with the needs approach, 
and similarly renders all «Quality of Life» measurement scales useless. 
Thus Caiman voices the most important assumption: «It is «0?possible 
to make value judgements about other people's 'quality of life'. It is 
their own perception which matters».3 6 Sartorius gives a similar version 
of wants approach which includes these assumptions: «quality of life 
can be defined as the individual's perception of their position in life, 
in relation to their goals, and to the value-system which they have 
accepted and incorporated into their decision making». 3 7 Once joined 
to unlimited patient autonomy, this wants approach comes close to 
personalist «Quality of Life», in which a consequentialist ethical theory 
is used. 
In the needs approach, «Quality of Life» approach leads to the 
development of «Quality of Life» scales, (which differentiate the 
differentiate functional, physiological, and social needs of patients), 
an emphasis on medical paternalism, and proxy judgements. In a 
Catholic context, we have Richard A. McCormick's attempt to intro-
duce substantive «Quality of Life» into the bioethical discourse. For 
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applications, we encounter the double pathology question, and the 
spiritual criterion of O'Rourke. 
II. SUBSTANTIAL «QUALITY OF LIFE» CRITERIA 
Thus, one of the pioneering advocates in Catholic circles of 
introducing the «Quality of Life» ethic is Richard A. McCormick. 
He presents his view on the particular good that life is, as well as a 
criterion for discriminating when such life no longer serves the person. 
As well he suggests how this criterion could be converted into con-
crete operational terms for use in actual cases. A number of authors 
take exception to this approach. William May and David Bleich 
present typical views that oppose the approach of forming substantial 
«Quality of Life» criteria by offering a contrary view of life as an 
intrinsic good. Germain Grisez, for his part, presents a further 
objection by charging that instrumentalizing bodily life —central to 
McCormick's substantial «Quality of Life» criterion— brings with it, 
necessarily, an unacceptable anthropological dualism. 
1. McCormick —Life as Instrumental Good 
The debate over substantial «Quality of Life» criteria began in the 
1970's. McCormick contributed to this debate by penning the essay 
To Save or Let Die, which brought to the forefront many deeply felt 
concerns and issues involving «Quality of Life», asserting the need to 
make critical bioethic decisions within the «Quality of Life» ethic: 
«Briefly, if we must face the frightening task of making quality-of-life 
judgements —and we must— then we must face the difficult task of 
building criteria for these judgements)).3 8 But he still maintained that 
it is essential to «proceed with great humil ity, caution and 
tentativeness», seeing that when one deals with such critical issues, «it 
is better to err on the side of life», thus seeking to avoid the charge 
that, for him, the life could have no value 3 9. 
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McCormick looks to steer a middle course between a perceived 
rigid stance of a «Sanctity of Life» ethic that verges on vitalism, and 
the other extreme of a reliance only on the concrete details of each 
case, that is an approach without general norms of any k ind 4 0 . 
McCormick begins with the Judeo-Christian attitude toward human 
bodily life: it is neither an absolute good, nor useless when frustrating 
or burdensome. He continues with his view of that tradition: «The 
middle course that has structured Judeo-Christian attitudes is that 
life is indeed a basic and precious good, but a good to be preserved 
precisely as the condition of other values».4 1 
McCormick comes to his criterion of capacity for interpersonal 
relationships by beginning with the magisterial pronouncements on 
means and ends in prolonging life. After quoting Pius XII on the 
higher more important end, McCormick asks two questions: «First, 
what are these spiritual ends, and this 'higher, more important good?'; 
and how is its attainment rendered too difficult by the use of 
extraordinary means to preserve life?»42 
To answer the first question, he frames this higher good in terms 
of the love to be shown to God and to neighbor. He marks the sense 
of the identification of love of neighbor with love for God, and 
continues: 
The good our love wants to do to Him and which he 
enables us, can be done only to the neighbor, as Karl Rahner 
has so forcefully argued. It is in others that God demands to 
be recognized and loved. If this is true, it means that, in the 
Judeo-Christian perspective, the meaning, substance, and 
consummation of life is found in human relationships, and 
the qualities of justice, respect, concern, compassion, and 
support that surround them. Second, how is the attainment 
of this 'higher, more important (than life) good' rendered 
'too difficult' by life-supports that are gravely burdensome? 
One who must support his life with disproportionate effort 
focuses the time, attention, energy and resources of himself 
and others not precisely on relationships, but on maintaining 
the condition of relationships. ... The importance of 
relationships gets lost in the struggle for survival4 3. 
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What is now extraordinary is that which will render this relationship 
impossible to achieve. Judgements are made about the condition, 
rather than the means, of prolonging life: a «Quality of Life» 
perspective. After reviewing some examples of circumstances which 
traditionally were used to show how means became extraordinary, 
McCormick asserts for these that «often enough it is the kind of, the 
quality of life thus saved (painful, poverty stricken and deprived, away 
from home and friends, oppressive) that establishes the means as 
extraordinary. Thattype of life would be an excessive hardship for the 
individual*. 4 4 Traditional use of the principle of double effect 
concentrated on the intention toward the immediate effects, the 
burden the use of the means would bring about. McCormick looks 
toward the continued life itself as the burden to be avoided, a life 
incapable or so burdened that one cannot exercise one's relational 
capacity. Of such a life, it «can be said to have reached its potential*. 4 5 
And in a different article: «The issue here is this: In weighing the 
burden-benefits of a treatment, is it the burden of the treatment only 
(e.g. its pain, expense, etc.) that is legitimately considered, or may we 
include in the assessment the burden of continued existence itself? In 
other words, may the quality of life preserved be a proper dimension 
of the calculus?*4 6 
In essence, bodily life without capacity for personal relationships, 
for McCormick, provides no benefit for the person. He explains: 
Concretely, if 'life' means only metabolism and vital 
processes, then what is meant by saying that this is a 'good 
in itself? If that means a good to be preserved independently 
of any capacity for conscious experience, I believe it is a 
straightforward form of vitalism —an approach that preser-
ves life (mere vital processes) no matter what the condition 
of the patient. One can and, I believe, should say that the 
person is always an incalculable value, but at some point 
continuance in physical life offers the person no benefit. 
Indeed to keep 'life' going can easily be an assault on the 
person and his dignity. Therefore, phrases such as 'the good 
of life in itself are misleading in these discussions.4 7 
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Paris 4 8 also views capacity for spiritual function as normative: 
«Ordinary means are those which are not disproportionately costly, 
burdensome or painful, and —this is the important part— they must 
also offer substantial hope of benefit to a person, not simply to his 
liver, lungs or heart. What we are to be valued for is our personhood, 
and if this treatment cannot offer substantial benefit to the person, 
not just to his or her chemistries, it is extraordinary and need not be 
applied». Paris here is making explicit in these quotes his opinion 
that human bodily life is not a good in itself. To determine its goodness, 
we must look to the qualities that life possesses: «to make these 
decisions we must consider the 'quality of life' of our patients». 4 9 
However, Paris apparendy believes it to be self evident that unconscious 
personal existence is not a proportionate good; he does not enter into 
argumentation, rather in his articles presents graphic examples of poor 
((Quality of Life». 
2. May and Bleich —Life as Intrinsic Good 
Thus, while McCormick sees life as a good that is conditioned by 
its quality, that is, by the benefit that it offers to the bearer, others 
hold a more basic view that life is a 'basic good'. This 'basic good' is 
intrinsic to persons, and is among the many basic goods 0/persons. 
The following presents as typical of a number of authors, the views of 
Catholic theologian William May, and Jewish Physician David Bleich. 
a) May —Life is Intrinsically Good 
William E. May supports a contrary position, stating: «Human 
bodily life is a great good. It is a good of the person and intrinsic to 
the person and is not a mere instrumental good or good for the 
person». 5 0 Clearly he does not deny the difficulties with caring for 
such patients, but adds: «But such care is not without its benefits. 
Since it is necessary to sustain life, such care benefits the nondying 
patient by serving this fundamental personal good —human life 
itself— which, as we have explained, remains good in itself no matter 
how burdened it may become due to the patient's poor condition^ 5 1 
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May attacks the «Quality of Life» approach that discounts the 
obligation to provide means, even «ordinary» means, due to the poor 
quality of the patient's life. He points out the difficulty in maintaining 
such a position, while at the same time professing to hold out also for 
respecting life. He charges such a «Quality of Life» ethic as being 
incompatible with true appreciation and respect for the person to be 
included in the intention when acting: 
Moreover, if we judge that someone's life is so burdensome 
that there is no longer any obligation to preserve it, are we 
not in essence saying that this person's life is no longer good, 
but now has become a disvalue, a burden, and that, 
consequently, the person would be better off dead than alive? 
This seems to be clearly implied when McCormick asserts 
that 'that type of life would be an excessive hardship for the 
individual.' The burden which needs to be lifted is not the 
burden of a treatment, but the burden of a life. And this is 
lifted only when the person is dead. In my opinion, 
McCormick's proposal denigrates the inherent value of 
human bodily life, regarding it as a good for the person, not 
as a good o/the person. It is good only so long as it serves as 
the condition for what McCormick regards as truly human 
or personal goods, namely relational goods whose existence 
is dependent upon one's conscious awareness of them 5 2 . 
May counters that in McCormick's view: «life itself, in the sense of 
physical or biological life, is what an older terminology would have 
called a bonum utile, not a bonum bonestum».5i McCormick responds 
to this by arguing: «First one could say that life is a good to be preserved 
insofar as it contains some potentiality for human experience is not 
to make life a bonum utile, or merely a useful good, and therefore a 
kind of negotiable thing. Rather it is to talk about our duties —and 
especially the why of those duties— toward the preservation of the 
bonum honestum, that is a good in itself, the dying human person, 
and to admit that these duties may differ depending upon the 
conditions of that bonum honestum».°>4 
This response appears weak, because if one is ready to admit 
something to be a good in itself, one should be ready to also admit 
QUALITY OF LIFE 217 
that such a good should oblige, then, at least the ordinary means, 
that is, those within the reach of persons without excessive burden 
and which are useful, (i.e., not futile). And once the means have been 
qualified to be ordinary, the use of such means should not be predicated 
on the condition of the patient, as the condition will not change, in 
the Christian perspective, the 'good in itself to a disvalue for anyone 
involved. McCormick offers an additional response: 
Second, and perhaps even more to the point, it could be 
counterstated that the usage of 'useful good' and 'good in 
itself plays upon the ambiguity of the term 'life'. 'Life' can 
itself mean two general things: (1) a state of human 
functioning, (or capacity thereof), of well being; or (2) the 
existence of vital and metabolic processes with no human 
functioning or capacity. We do not, in Christian perspectives, 
preserve these functions for their own sake; we are not vitalists. 
In this second sense of'life', then, one could argue that it is 
indeed a useful good only, though it is not clear to me how 
such terminology illuminates the matter 5 5. 
This second response has its problems as well. To lay the charge of 
vitalism toward those who would maintain biological life, is to miss 
the point that where human bodily life exists, there also exists the person. 
Treating the live human body as «mere human biological life», would 
be to take on a either a form of dualism, where the person is viewed as 
apart from his body, or a form of actualism, which recognizes the person 
to exist only when a state of human functioning can be measurably 
detected, usually according to tests for cognitive function. Moreover, 
vitalism implies the preservation of life at all costs as an absolute good, 
whereas May enjoins only ordinary means. Furthermore, to regard 
human biological life as a useful good is to veer toward disrespect for 
the person, for all personal life is a good in itself. 
b) Bleich —A Judaic View 
David Bleich comes to many conclusions similar to those of May. 
In presenting a Jewish position, he posits that the «reason» for the 
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fifth commandment could conceivably be to counter euthanasia, ac-
tive or passive. He sees the moral judgement that murder, for ignoble 
reasons, as wrong, is able to be grasped by man by the light of his own 
reason. «Revelation is necessary precisely because the act is prohibited 
even in those situations in which man's moral moral faculty, if left to 
its own devices, would not recognize the deed as repugnant, viz., when 
the taking of human life constitutes euthanasia».5 6 Although the Judaic 
tradition is not equivalent to vitalism, it does consider that «Human 
life is not a good to be preserved as a condition of other values but as 
an absolute, basic, and precious good in its own stead. The obligation 
to preserve life is commensurately all-encompassing».5 7 Bleich argues 
that despite the decline in health and faculties, and accompanied by 
suffering, God's dominion and glory, incomprehensible and 
mysterious, demands that life be respected, and this precludes 
intentional acts or omissions to terminate human life. 
Through a reductio ad absurdum, Bleich also brings out logical 
consequences: if life is an instrumental good, then when it can no 
longer lead to the basic goods, the acceptance of euthanasia, active or 
passive follows. This would embrace not only the permanently 
unconscious, but all others not able to achieve the integral human 
fulfillment; such patients could be eliminated with moral impunity. 
The inherent repugnance leads one to question the major premise, 
that life is not a bonum perse™. As well, the Christian sense of suffering, 
as redemptive and of great value, is stripped of all meaning. 
3. The Reasonableness Standard 
The question of whether life is an instrumental good or an intrinsic 
good is but one controversial point raised by McCormick in his par-
ticular «Quality of Life» view. Another concerns the method by which 
a consensus would be obtained so as to obtain substantial operational 
criteria for the actual bioethic cases. McCormick proposes that such a 
consensus exists through community goals and priorities placed on 
life, in a given culture and epoch. For his part, Walter examines this 
as a workable public policy in an ethically pluralistic society. 
As to how to assess the relational capacity criterion, McCormick 
prefers a «reasonableness» standard that would be «what most of us, 
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in similar circumstances, would do —as reasonable people with healthy 
outlooks on the meaning of life and death». 5 9 Walter 6 0 attempts to 
base public policy on this substantive criterion of relational potential 
as enunciated by McCormick. He notes the process to begin with the 
normative anthropology: «the meaning, substance and consummation 
of life are found in human relationships)). Our human flourishing is 
done in community with others. Walter takes into account that, for 
McCormick, Christian revelation does not give us concrete moral 
judgements on how to achieve this, rather that the Christian story 
and symbols focus us on the transcendental human goods that bear 
directly on this human flourishing. For the basic direction on concre-
te acts, however, insights are available by all humans. It is here where 
McCormick locates the reasonable person standard. Walter interprets 
this standard as expressing that set of human insights considered 
normative. 
This formal criterion, the reasonable person standard, is admitted 
as distinct from the substantive criterion of relational potential towards 
which it will be directed. «The judgement of reasonable people is not 
constitutive of the Tightness of the decision. It is merely confirmatory 
that the criterion is close to the mark». 6 1 The judgement of the best 
interests of an incompetent patient, as normative, is then based on 
this reasonable person standard, and interpreted by it. 
A difficulty arises when one stops to ponder about what is the 
content of the reasonable person standard. In order to enclose more 
than circularity, (i.e., reasonable person standards are those that 
reasonable persons hold and should be normative because they are, 
by definition reasonable), one must specify what presumptions one 
uses to define reasonableness, and rationality, especially if this term is 
intended to be anchored to a wide secular base, prescinding from the 
theologically understood natural law. Johnson writes of the continuing 
difficulty in encountering such firmness when departing from such 
secular philosophic premises. 6 2 
Walter provides further premises of McCormick's reasonable person 
standard: «Because our moral reasons are historically conditioned, 
the set of normative insights can fluctuate between advance and de-
cline depending upon our society's historical-cultural situation». 6 3This, 
however, presents questions: on what basis can we actually qualify 
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such fluctuations as advances or declines if not by a standard 
transcendent of history and culture? Pragmatism and relativity in ethics 
comes up against the notion generally held that there is an objectivity 
to right and wrong, not just a correct process to be followed. Clearly 
an ethical base must be logical, but what are the premises of the 
rationality? How are we to judge these premises against those who 
hold other premises? Is the response only to be that what is right or 
reasonable is that which is being held by most? 
4. « Quality of Life» and Dualism 
While there are evident difficulties with the reasonable person stan-
dard, there are still other complications that come with McCormick's 
«Quality of Life» approach. Certain anthropological assumptions are 
inherent in the view that bodily life is a good for the person. The 
unity of the person is a characteristic of both universal experience 
and explicit Judeo-Christ ian teaching. Grisez examines this 
anthropologically, and finds it wanting. Wildes, however, defends an 
instrumentality based not on ontological distinctions, but rather on 
categorical conceptual distinctions, and applies this particularly to 
PVS patients. This view, however, appears confused, and does not 
convincingly dislodge the criticism levelled by Grisez. 
a) Grisez —«Quality of Life» Is Dualistic 
Grisez takes special exception to the consideration of human bodily 
life under the aspect of instrumentality, following the criticism of 
McCormick's analysis made by May. Grisez shows an inescapable affront 
of this position towards the anthropological unity of the human person: 
In denying that 'mere physical existence' is inherently 
good, O'Rourke, McCormick, and all who share their views 
presuppose that a person's life has only the status of an ins-
trumental good —something which human persons have 
and use for their specifically human purposes, but, 
nevertheless, something which remains really distinct from 
what human persons are. For if O'Rourke and McCormick 
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did not presuppose that human life is only an instrumental 
good, they could not hold it pointless to preserve a person's 
life unless 'some degree of cognitive-affective function' can 
be restored or 'other values remain attainable'. But a person's 
life is not merely an instrumental good. It is the very actuality 
of his or her living body, and —although human persons 
also have spiritual powers and acts which cannot be reduced 
to bodily capacities and functions— a human being's living 
body is the bodily person. To deny this is to accept a position 
which requires some sort of dualistic theory of human 
persons —that is, a theory according to which human beings 
are inherently disembodied realities who only have, inhabit, 
and use their bodies 6 4. 
Grisez expands upon dualism, showing how we must 
reject it. It is untenable in that it cannot explain the unity 
that we all perceive in our very selves. Pope John Paul II 
states similarly that such a conclusion, the ability to perceive 
normatively human bodily life as apart from the person, as 
stemming from a proportionalist moral theory, «does not 
correspond to the truth about man and his freedom. It 
contradicts the Church's teachings on the unity of the human 
person, whose rational soul is perse et essentialiter the form of 
the body». 6 5 
b) Wildes —Category of Instrumental Good 
Without denying the essential unity in being of man, Kevin Wildes 
seeks to reconcile the advantages that one could realize with the 
instrumentalist view of life, with the anthropological difficulty raised 
by Grisez. Thus, Wildes argues for a conceptualAuaHism, basing himself 
on distinctions made by Dewey, in an attempt to overcome the 
difficulties that arise with ontological dualism 6 6. He charges: «The 
absurdity that they [Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle] demonstrate rests on 
the assumption that the dualism of life and person is necessary 
ontological. But why must this be the case? Could there not be a 
conceptual distinction of the two without having a commitment to 
an ontological dualism? There is a significant difference between 
drawing a conceptual distinction and holding that the conceptual 
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distinction has ontological status, that is that the distinction implies 
the existence of two substances».67 
It is difficult to follow the argument of Wildes and Dewey. Parent, 
friend, physician, neighbor, perhaps would be examples of concep-
tual distinctions. But these terminologies are also partial in their scope, 
not universal, that is, a man is a friend to one and a father to another, 
and neither to a third, and none of these capture the fundamental 
whole of the person. It seems rash to base life and death decisions on 
partial concepts which admittedly do not embrace the whole of the 
reality addressed. Wildes is careful with his language, stating that a 
mentally disabled person may reach the p.v.s. level or be materially 
equivalent to a p.v.s. patient. In those cases, the categorical 
understanding of human life would argue that there is no obligation 
to sustain the life of such a patient by medical means. Does this imply, 
however, which means if any, still must be employed ethically, since 
the bodily life will not instrumentally support integral human 
fulfillment? Does this conceptualization of human life into «biological 
life of a human being, one's integral fulfillment, and the pursuit of 
goods as conditions of that fulfillment)) give us normative direction 
as to how to treat human life? Wildes concludes that we can still view 
the basic goods as practical reasons, but bodily life remains instru-
mental. It is not clear how one does not end up instrumentalizing as 
well other basic human goods, such as friendship, truth knowledge, 
excellence in performance, peace and fraternity as conducive to one's 
integral fulfillment. It does not seem possible to balance «the pursuit 
of goods as well as conditions (necessarily instrumental) of that 
fulfillment)).68 
The conceptualization of biological life as only a necessary condition 
of human, personal life, necessarily regards bodily life as instrumen-
tal, and not a basic good. Wildes acknowledges the unity of body and 
soul to be constitutive of the person. There are no human persons, 
however, without bodily life. There is a difficulty then for young 
children (who do not yet act for ends), and PVS patients: is their life 
to be conceived as an instrumental good, until they can or are achieving 
the higher goods? In attempting to answer this question, Wildes raises 
a number more, when he states: «It seems crucial to remember that 
the brain is the integrating organ for the human being. It is the proper 
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matter of the faculty of the rational soul. When it is medically clear 
that the matter has been destroyed, then it seems impossible to argue 
that a substantial union of body and soul remains or that an obligation 
to sustain life remains». 6 9 The new questions appear as at what point 
could we say that living body before us, quite apparently a human 
being, has ceased being a personal human being and can now be 
regarded as a supported cadaver? 
Grisez and Boyle respond to this at tempt to evade the 
instrumentalist dualism: 
A very philosophical attempt to escape from the dilemma 
takes the following form. Perhaps the human self is in 
theoretical truth only one entity but for practical purposes 
has to be regarded as two entities —a living organism and a 
person, the former merely instrumental and the latter an 
end in itself. The difficulty with this attempt is that if one 
treats as two in practice what what one maintains to be one 
in theory, there seems to be no single perspective to use in 
distinguishing and relating the theoretical and the practical 
perspectives. If one says that what is existentially many is 
really one, then moral life seems to rest upon a false 
assumption, a kind of fiction at odds with reality. If one says 
that the two perspectives are equally validznd merely distinct, 
the question arises how they can be distinct enough to avoid 
being incompatible while being unified enough to allow 
oneself or any self to think and talk about 'my life' and 'my 
dignity'. 7 0 
III. DOUBLE PATHOLOGY 
The debate in the preceding sections over distinctions, notions 
and nuances introduced by the teleologic approach raises a further 
question concerning the role that «Quality of Life» can play in 
determining the proportionality of means, and is highlighted in the 
question: to what extent should the proportionate means for a certain 
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condition be evaluated in the light of other health complications? 
This is the case of a person who suffers from two lethal pathologies 7 1. 
Clearly the principles involved are those of proportionality itself, 
especially the time of life to be expected with the adage parum pro 
nihil reputatur, and the magnitude of the benefit summed up in nemo 
ad inutile tenetur. 
1. Presentation of the Question 
Several authors support the view that in certain cases the fatal 
pathologies constitute a relativizing factor with respect to normative 
injunction to always utilize proportionate means. Kelly, Ramsey and 
Callahan are among those who expound such a view. A critique of 
this position follows. 
Kelly brings up the question of double pathology relativization 
when he discusses De Lugo's concept of parum pro nihil reputatur, 
regarding food, noting it to be a natural means for sustaining life, 
while the other authors speak of remedies, something artificial. 
Kelly presents a case study of McCarthy who appears to be one of 
the first to consider the question: 7 2 a patient with diabetes and termi-
nal cancer, with a remaining life expectancy of six months. McCarthy 
insisted that the diabetes be considered apart from the terminal cancer; 
to do otherwise would fix the immediate intention as one of shortening 
life. In his analysis, Kelly states first, that insulin use alone appears to 
be an incontrovertible ordinary means, and its use would hardly 
approach a moral impossibility, except in very unusual cases. «This 
seems to be a clear case of a reasonable hope of success: a combination 
of slight difficulty plus high probability, if not moral certainty, of 
checking the disease indefinitely». 7 3 In the case of the concurrent 
pathologies, though basically agreeing with McCarthy, 7 4 Kelly 
expresses also his doubts: 
[Tjhis problem provokes another question: namely, is a 
person who suffers from two lethal diseases obliged to take 
ordinary means of checking one of them when there is no 
hope of checking the other? In other words, granted the 
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presence of the incurable cancer, can the insulin be said to 
still offer a reasonable hope of success? Must we consider 
the diseases separately, or should we consider the patient's 
total condition? I see no perfectly clear answer to these 
questions 7 5. 
It is not clear that Kelly is focusing on medical means alone, seeking 
to determine the moral impossibility that they might involve, and 
the hope of benefit that they hold out. Rather, it seems that the 
«Quality of Life» is theoretically a factor to be considered. He does 
not expressly indicate the circumstances that might relativize the 
insulin, such as the imminent onset of grave pain from the cancer. 
Kelly's query is central to the double pathology question: should the 
otherwise proportionate means be relativized by the existence of a 
second pathology? 
He continues by presenting a possible relativizing factor: if the 
two pathologies have connections, that is to say, if there were grave 
interactions, or if they really are complications from the same basic 
disease7 6. Although some contend that this question with its «Quality 
of Life» slant has always been part of the theologic heritage, and is to 
be resolved in favor of less suffering of the patient, it seems that only 
recently has medicine offered the possibility to diagnose and separate 
divergent fatal pathologies 7 7. 
Ramsey, in his analysis of this question raised by Kelly and 
McCarthy, takes further note of the effects of interaction, and develops 
this idea through one of his central notions: moral analysis should 
center on the patient as a person, and not only focus on diseases 
singularly. The patient is a unity, in which the diseases occur: 
Doctors do not treat diseases, though they often conquer 
them. They treat patients, and here finally all fail. If a diabetic 
patient need not prescind from the cancer in determining 
her obligation to start or continue to use insulin, the reason 
is that she is one flesh in which both diseases adhere. If to 
use insulin for her is quite useless, it is surely contraindicated. 
To move beyond the interrelation of the ills to which all 
flesh is heir requires that we move to the flesh that is heir to 
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all its ills, indifferent to whether these ills are connected or 
physiologically unrelated. It is this flesh, and not the diseases 
one by one, that is the subject of medical treatment. The 
truth is enough to undercut the bondage of conscience to 
the imperativeness of 'customary' or 'usual' procedures for 
treating single diseases78. 
Ramsey appears to sympathize with the relativizing factor more 
strongly than Kelly, though he is not in favor of proceeding at will in 
the matter. He refers to De Lugo's treatment of parum pro nihil 
reputatur, and later acknowledges that a meaningful length of time 
for life would oblige the then proportionate means 7 9. 
Callahan is currently one of the strongest voices in favor of the 
double pathology relativization, but in his distinct form. He has argued 
extensively for common sense moderation in the use of ever more 
sophisticated technology 8 0 . This is not because of any anti-
technological stance, but rather because of «our culture's obsession 
with technology, which so often leads us to use it unthinkingly and 
insensitively*.81 He counsels us to hesitate before rushing to do all 
that we can, seeing that nature might provide, in a concurrent 
pathology, a more gentle death, than that which ultimately would be 
faced should means be applied. He urges: 
... we must learn to be more opportunistic about death, 
as physicians used to be. If we see a person dying, and that 
person is beset, for example, by pneumonia or some other 
opportunistic infection, we should remember that antibiotic 
treatment would likely set this person up for a lingering 
death. We should seize upon this means of dying that would 
bring upon a better rather than a worse death and be prepared 
to embrace it 8 2 . 
He questions whether physicians must always use their knowledge 
and skill to conserve lives. He sees the medical tradition as not 
necessarily embracing such an obligation. In this way he contend that 
more often it must be taken into account that the patient's welfare 
may not indicate that a certain pathology be combatted; rather, 
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admitting the patients mortality we can «bring disease as a cause of 
death back into the care of the dying». 8 3 Clearly one extreme, that 
Callahan wishes to avoid, is that of excessive, overzealous treatment, 
out of proportion with the result to be expected, an intervention that, 
for example, would hold out the promise of very little additional time 
of life for all its burdens. However, what is not clear in these authors, 
is how one could protect from a swing to the opposite extreme, that 
of opting for a sweet death, or a 'Catholic euthanasia, that gives 
excessive room for abuse in the determination of proportionate time 
of extended life or of the burdens of suffering. 
2. Discussion of Essential Elements 
a) Fatal Pathology 
Besides the distinction of artificial and natural means, the notion 
of fatal pathology is central to the teleologic approach championed 
by O'Rourke. The present author joins Vaccari in questioning the 
solidity of the concept of fatal pathology, especially as applied to PVS 
patients. The discussion leads naturally to a question treated in a 
subsequent section, that of the determination of proportionality in 
the case where concurrent fatal pathologies exist. 
This limit on the ethical obligation to prolong the life of the 
permanently unconscious is linked, in O'Rourke's analysis, with what 
constitutes a terminal patient, and what is a fatal pathology 8 4. He 
develops the notion of a terminal condition, separating out the 
concepts of a patient with a «fatal pathology» and patient that is 
«imminently dying». Thus, a patient with acute kidney failure has 
such a «fatal pathology», but due to effective hemodialysis, cannot be 
considered to be ((imminently dying». The concept of fatal pathology, 
as presented by O'Rourke and others, 8 5 denotes any disease or lesion 
that, if left untreated, will cause death; a more current understanding 
would hold the same, but with the understanding that no cure or 
treatment exists for the condition. 
The obligation toward patients who are 'imminently dying' remains 
quite clear for most Catholic authors. What O'Rourke is trying to 
distinguish is the obligation that we have toward those with a 'fatal 
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pathology', but are not ' imminently dying'. The fatal pathology 
assigned to PVS patients, for example, is the inability to chew or 
swallow, a fatal condition if not circumvented by tube assisted feeding. 
Since O'Rourke assigns no benefit to permanently unconscious life, 
he applies his limits of obligation directly to these cases, as he allows 
that one can morally abate feeding in these cases and allow the patient 
to die: 
Grasping the distinction between causing death and 
allowing a pathology to take its natural course because there 
is no benefit to the patient in circumventing or removing 
the pathology, is a fine distinction. Yet it is a real and firm 
dist inct ion, as those who have experienced cl inical 
decisionmaking will avow. In 1957, when Pope Pius XII 
stated that respirators could be removed if they were of no 
benefit to the patient, he did not expect the patients to live 
after the removal of the respirators86. 
Thus, if there exists a fatal pathology, the question for O'Rourke 
is not «is death imminent?* but rather, «do we have a moral duty to 
remove or circumvent that fatal pathology?» For this position, the 
resolution in each case would involve not only the burdens and benefits 
of means, but also of life: 
A hopelessly ill patient's situation may be stable and not 
perceptively deteriorating. For instance, a severely or 
irreversibly demented patient may be 'hopelessly' ill, but 
medically he is not in terminal illness, because the mental 
illness is not life threatening. Another example would be a 
paraplegic or quadriplegic patient. It would be wrong not to 
treat these patients for pneumonia or some life-threatening 
infection and thereby not to stabilize their health. Terminal 
illness, on the other hand, means that the illness is 
progressing, treatment cannot restore the health of the 
patient, and medical intervention can only prolong the dying 
process or maintain purely vegetative existence8 7 
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It is this vegetative existence that is an example of a life that 
constitutes a burden for not only the afflicted person, but also the 
family and society. To «prolong the dying» is considered ineffective; 
no cure is expected. This notion of dying is at odds with the common 
notion. One is not considered dying for years except in a rhetorical 
way; such a condition is rather a chronic illness of a person who is not 
dying. 
He presents the PVS case as illustrative of the fatal pathology 
approach. The PVS condition is portrayed as one that brings with it, 
necessarily, an inability to chew and swallow. Specifically O'Rourke 
cites the case of Nancy Cruzan as example of this 8 8 . However, as a 
standard benchmark, the PVS condition does not appear to be so 
useful for serving as the model for fatal pathology analysis. Others, 
such as the AMA, grant much more leeway for PVS patients' abilities: 
((Cardiorespiratory activity, swallowing, and digestive and other non-
neurological vital functions are usually preserved to the extent that 
standard nutritional and supportive measures will sustain life 
indefinitely. Persons in PVS ordinarily require neither long-term 
respiratory support nor circulatory assistance to survive*.8 9 Likewise, 
Cranford substantially concurs in this prognosis that PVS patients 
often retain the ability to swallow: 
Because PVS patients often have an intact involuntary 
swallowing reflex in addition to intact gag and cough reflexes, 
it is, theoretically, and in rare cases, practically possible, to 
feed these patients by hand. However, this usually requires 
an enormous amount of time and effort by health care 
professionals and families. If the patient is positioned 
properly, and food is carefully placed in the back of the throat, 
the patient's involuntary swallowing reflex will be activated. 
However, the overwhelming majority of patients are given 
fluids and nutrition by nasogastric tubing, gastrostomy, or 
other medical means 9 0. 
As such it is not clear that we can rotundly claim a fatal pathology 
exists concurrently with all PVS patients; indeed the court testimony 
in the Cruzan case indicates that Nancy Cruzan retained swallowing 
230 MARTIN J. MILLER 
ability for some time after her accident. Tube feeding was initiated 
precisely to facilitate long term care. In fact an explicit decision was 
made not to verify in any way if swallowing ability remained; Cranford 
testified that spoon feeding is withheld in such cases as being «morally 
repugnant*, and «would be totally inconsistent* with what was 
wanted 9 1 . 
Thus we can conclude that caution is warranted: just as the decision 
to decline nutrition and hydration does not necessarily indicate an 
intention to cause death, neither in the case of PVS patients and other 
mentally incapacitated is such an action (abatement) always morally 
indicated. 
Given the wide range of PVS symptoms with differing severity, a 
difficulty exists. Some in a PVS retain the ability to chew or swallow, 
as did Marybeth Cruzan for many years, and we are held by the 
teleological analysis of O'Rourke to give them nourishment, as their 
condition does not exhibit fatal pathology symptoms. The fact remains 
that their facility for seeking life's purpose is in no degree different 
from the case of those where such ability to chew or swallow has been 
lost. The obligation to feed is predicated on such accessibility to 
spiritual function, not directly on the ability to chew or swallow. 
Clearly the burdens of feeding must be examined, but the burdens of 
manual feeding exceed by far those of artificial conveyance. If the 
patient contracts a secondary pathology, such as a pneumonia, are 
the proportionate means of simple antibiotics to be considered 
optional? Is the pneumonia a new «fatal pathology*, since the 
antibiotics will not cure the PVS condition? Such a conclusion is not 
easily derived from application of the principle of double effect, but 
rather perhaps from the view that nemo ad inutile tenitur, considering 
life in a PVS as useless or of no benefit. But the required manual 
feeding is just as proportionate to the cure as the antibiotic. From 
this view it appears that the «fatal pathology* approach may hide an 
intention for passive euthanasia. This will be treated in a subsequent 
section. 
Michael Vaccari questions the validity itself of the concept of fatal 
pathology. He sees nutrition and hydration as means to conserve life, 
and conceives the distinction between treatment and care to be less 
important, since our obligations are framed in terms of conserving 
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life. Fatal Pathology is presented as both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive: over-inclusive in that it cannot be limited to a PVS with 
fatal pathologies, rather it applies to such a wide range of illness that 
the question to forego nutrition and hydration becomes the standard 
rather than the exception; under-inclusive in that it fails to apply in 
certain cases involving the decision to forego treatment that were 
covered by the traditional approach. Vaccari concludes that fatal 
pathology approach is inadequate, because it focuses the analysis on 
factors unrelated to the effectiveness or burdensomeness of treatment. 
He asks: «Do fatal pathologies have characteristics that are relevant to 
the usefulness / burden analysis? Are treatments for fatal pathologies 
always burdensome or useless or more often burdensome or useless 
than treatments for nonfatal pathologies?*92 Concluding that it is not 
the case, he charges that O'Rourke's approach fails to resolve the moral 
question involving intentionality. 
Vaccari makes this all more evident by summarizing O'Rourke's 
procedure: First, one is to ask: is there a fatal pathology? Second, will 
the applications of means for the fatal pathology be effective in 
restoring or maintaining the ability to strive for life's purpose? And, if 
effective, do they involve excessive burden? If the lead question, 
however, does not cover all life support treatment cases, one is to 
resort to the analysis of burdens and usefulness. But here Vaccari retorts: 
«If one's decision is not made on the basis of the fatal nature of the 
pathology, then the methodology proposed by Fr. O'Rourke adds 
nothing to the analysis*.9 3 Why introduce the first question at all? 
b) Proportionality of Life Itself 
The first two foregoing sections, the teleologic approach and double 
pathology relativization, bring up the issue of the proportionality of 
means (involving their benefits and burdens) when faced with poor 
«Quality of Life». Life is normally conceived as a benefit, but what 
about life without consciousness? A number of authors explicitly 
nuance the primary focus of the Declaration on Euthanasia on means, 
adding that a further benefit must accrue to patient: consciousness as 
a basic minimum. Life in a PVS is seen as not sufficiently doted to be 
considered as a «benefit» proportionate enough to normatively oblige 
life support. Other authors maintain that life is a good, and that 
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ordinary means are obligatory despite the condition of the patient, as 
long as they are useful and do not imply excessive burden. 
The key question becomes: Is bodily life, without consciousness, a 
good?The proliferation of articles about the «Quality of Life» of PVS 
and anencephalic patients underscores the belief that these can be 
included in such a category. If this can be established in the affirmative, 
a fortiori, obligations can be deduced for other debilitated conditions, 
as unconscious human life is seen as a minimum state. If so, also all 
ordinary means to conserve that life are indeed useful, they keep the 
person alive. Moreover, if it is a basic good, indeed a great good, then 
it is like a moral absolute, falling within the gambit of the positive 
and negative sides of the fifth commandment, thou shalt not kill. 
A «Quality of Life» ethic, however, typically argues that life is not 
an absolute good, but good for other goods. In fact, that mere bodily 
life alone is no benefit at all. Thus from this, the input of the «Quality 
of Life» ethic requires that the «ordinary» means are not always 
obligatory, because the good of bodily life is not seen as proportionate 
to the available means, however easily they can be applied. 
After an introductory discussion on the specific angle of monetary 
burdens for PVS patients, which is important for deciding the 
proportionality of life support, The view of the Magisterium is 
presented, along with the opinions of a number of theologians: Griese, 
Moraczewski, Meilaender, Smith and O'Rourke. 
The analysis of the benefits and burdens of given treatments 
necessarily include their economic dimensions. Thus treatment which 
is affordable, or assisted sufficiently by state intervention may establish 
a means as proportionate for one case, while in a identical case, such 
monetary factors could constitute an insurmountable burden. Much 
disagreement have surfaced over the financial burdens that PVS 
patients produce. Grisez gives argumentation that for developed 
countries, the financial burden for maintaining incapacitated patients 
frequently does not constitute a moral impossibility 9 4. Cranford no-
tes that the cost of maintaining PVS patients can vary considerably, 
and cites such costs in 1988 for Minnesota as ranging between $ 19,000 
and $25,000 per year 9 5. Phillip Boyle presents costs higher by an order 
of magnitude, representing maintenance by total perenteral nutrition, 
which is not necessarily typical for a PVS patient, because of its 
QUALITY OF LIFE 233 
exorbitant expense9 6. Bopp noted that in the Cruzan case, the actual 
costs (in 1988) of her feeding (7.8$ per day) were 2.6% of maintenance 
costs, with total costs at 110,000$ per year 9 7 . With the varying 
institutional costs and insurance coverage, it does not appear conclusive 
that all PVS maintenance is extraordinary, as some claim. 9 8 The fact 
that tube feeding would cost considerably less than spoon feeding is 
noticed by May and others who state that with proper supervision, 
home hospice care for permanently unconscious persons can often 
be carried out by people without profession training, once feeding 
tubes are in place. This, however, is not to claim that such care does 
not involve burdens or substantial commitments 9 9. 
Besides the financial aspects, there are further questions about the 
basic issue of the proportionality of supporting «mere» human life. 
There have surfaced suggestions that nutrition and hydration are not 
ethically obliging depending on the «Quality of Life», while other 
aspects of ordinary care continue to bind. Callahan, for example, in 
an early article, maintained this posture, and spoke out on the need 
to continue food and water, even if were only a gesture of our solidarity, 
and «a tolerable price to pay to preserve —with ample margin to 
spare— one of the few moral emotions that could easily be called a 
necessary social instinct». 1 0 0 Yet such an appeal is weak, and gives way 
to expediency. Many secular writers, such as Steinbrook and Lo, after 
placing nutrition and hydration on a par with CPR, mechanical 
ventilation, dialysis, and antibiotic therapy, claim that, for difficult 
cases, it should not be considered as part of «ordinary care» and 
similarly assert that caring should be shown by plans other than food 
and water 1 0 1 . The question is literally one of life and death, and thus 
takes on a particular importance for Catholic ethics, and for 
exhortations for public morality. 
The Magisterium and magisterial advisory bodies have examined 
the question of just what care would be proportional to life itself. The 
year following the publication of the Declaration on Euthanasia (1981) 
in an effort to aid pastoral efforts toward those critically ill, the Pon-
tifical Council Cor Unum (an advisory body for the Magisterium, 
but not magisterial perse) produced another document which reflected 
the points of the Declaration. It addressed, more in depth, a number 
of medical aspects and responsibilities of the medical profession. The 
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publication of this document, produced in 1976, was delayed until 
the issuance of the Declaration on Euthanasia. The document reiterated 
that although extraordinary measures are of an optional nature, the 
obligation still exists of applying the «minimal» measures: 
On the contrary, there remains the strict obligation to 
apply under all circumstances those therapeutic measures 
which are called 'minimal': that is, those which are normally 
and customar i ly used for the maintenance of life 
(alimentation, blood transfusions, injections, etc.) . To 
interrupt these minimal measures would, in practice, be 
equivalent to wishing to put an end to the patient's life 1 0 2 . 
This passage clarifies that the normal care referred to in the 
Declaration on Euthanasia includes nutrition and hydration. It is 
important to point out such distinctions, so as to give content to 
what is to be considered proportionate to life, even when such life is 
quite debilitated. As well, to deny or withdraw an ordinary or 
proportionate means itself, would constitute euthanasia; further 
intentions could not sufficiently inform such an act so as to make it 
licit. On the other hand, it is important to distinguish this basic care 
from the excessive concern for this earthly life, that might lead to 
excessive and inordinate treatment. Thus the Magisterium, in the 
Declaration, has stated that: ((Discontinuing medical procedures that 
are burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the 
expected outcome can be legitimate; it is the refusal of 'over-zealous' 
treatment. Here one does not will to cause death; one's inability to 
impede it is merely accepted 1 0 3 . And it continues stating that decisions 
should be made by the patient if he is competent, or if not, by legally 
recognized proxies, who are to decide to the interests and mind of the 
patient. 
Certainly one does not consider food and fluids in itself specifically 
as medicine to cure dementia or a comatose condition, rather as a 
means that is ordinary in many cases for the conservation of whatever 
life regardless of its condition. Such an approach was taken by the 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences (another advisory body for the 
Magisterium) when it stated in 1985: «If the patient is in a permanent, 
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irreversible coma, as far as can be foreseen, treatment is not required, 
but all care should be lavished upon him, including feeding*.1 0 4 Thus 
a distinction was made between medical care, which could become 
disproportionate, and a basic care that is always proportionate for the 
conservation of life (assuming it is neither medically futile, nor involves 
a moral impossibility). This is more apparent when one reads further 
commentary by this same Academy: «God intends the development 
of science for the good of man. When science can provide a means of 
conserving a man's life which can be a supplement to a natural means, 
then this artificial means would seem to be obligatory. It is true, 
however, that whereas natural means in general are ordinary means, 
artificial means of conserving life can be quite often extraordinary 
means and thus not obligatory. When artificial means are ordinary 
means, then they are obligatory*.1 0 5 Thus, the Academy, after rejecting 
the agglomeration of basic care into the medical treatment category, 
continues by rejecting a per se normative distinction between artifi-
cial and natural, relying on the determination of proportionality as 
the ethical source for normative decisionmaking. 
Recent magisterial writings continue to make the precision between 
«ordinary» or «basic» care and medical treatment. Pope John Paul II 
has distinguished basic care from medical treatment, and has 
envisioned such basic care as proportionate to the conservation of 
life. Thus even when a person has a serious illness «[it] does not dis-
pense from the valid therapeutic task of sustaining life nor from the 
administration of the normal means of vital support. Science, even 
when it is unable to heal, can and should care for and assist the sick*. 1 0 6 
And in a later address, he similarly condemned the practice as 
unacceptable, «...not even when it is the parents themselves, in the 
throes of emotion and disappointed in their expectations, who request 
euthanasia by means of suspension of treatment and nourishment*. 1 0 7 
Most recently, in Evangelium Vitae, the Pope touched briefly again 
on this content of basic care, where, speaking of eugenic abortion, he 
continued with the theme of handicapped newborns: «Following this 
same logic, the point has been reached where the most basic care, 
even nourishment, is denied to babies born with serious handicaps or 
illnesses. The contemporary scene, moreover, is becoming even more 
alarming by reason of the proposals, advanced here and there, to justify 
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even infanticide, following the same arguments used to justify the 
right to abortion. In this way, we revert to a state of barbarism one 
hoped had been left behind forever*.108 Here, it again appears clear 
that the Pope has advocated nutrition and hydration as care that is 
proportionate to the good of life, unless it is truly futile. 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church makes it clear when it 
states: «Even if death is thought imminent, the ordinary care owed to 
a sick person cannot be legitimately interrupted*. 1 0 9 
Among the theologians, Griese puts in context the earlier 
magisterial pronouncement by Pope Pius XII (Allocution of November 
24, 1957). Against those who hold to a «Quality of Life* approach, 
he quotes an earlier address of the Pope to give more breadth to his 
view on the value of bodily life: «Is it not false pity which claims to 
justify euthanasia and to remove from man purifying and meritorious 
suffering, not by a charitable and praiseworthy help but by death, as 
if one were deal ing with an irrat ional animal and without 
immortality?* 1 1 0 He concludes thus, that basic care must always be 
provided to the person, unless it is medically futile or otherwise involves 
moral impossibility. 
It is also precisely this «ordinary care* that Griese maintains the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith intended in order to 
precisely establish such «ordinary care* as nominally inviolable. 
Distinctions such as artificial or natural, for Griese, would carry no 
moral weight, but rather would defer to the analysis of proportionality: 
The Declaration on Euthanasia (1980) makes no 
distinction between feeding in the natural manner vs. feeding 
by artificial means when it states that 'ordinary cares which 
are due to the sick person are not to be interrupted. In accord 
with a respected Canon Law guideline, 'where the law does 
not distinguish, we should not distinguish' (ubi lex non 
distinguet, nec nos distinguere debemus), this would mean that 
food and drink are not to be interrupted regardless of the 
means employed at the time when the patient approaches 
the imminent-death status.... To say that basic care, such as 
feeding, can be discontinued automatically if the patient is 
unable to receive sustenance by way of mouth would be at 
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variance with the precise concept of 'euthanasia as clarified 
in the Holy See's Declaration on Euthanasia 1 1 1. 
Besides basic care, Griese develops the notion of a supplemental 
means as opposed to a substitutive means for artificial nutrition and 
hydration 1 1 2 . To see better the distinction between supplement and 
substitute, some examples might serve: for kidney ailments, diuretic 
stimulants or urinary catheters (supplements), and kidney dialysis 
(substitute); for temporary digestive tract disorders, sub-clavian vein 
total perenteral nutrition (substitute) vs. peripheral perenteral nutrition 
(supplement or substitute); for respiratory ailments, mechanical 
respiration (substitute) vs. enriched oxygen supply (supplement). Thus 
the argument is made that for the disorder of swallowing impairment 
as found in some PVS patients, tube feeding is supplemental, whereas 
total perenteral nutrition is substitutive. The substitutive could be 
considered extraordinary per se, the supplemental such only per 
accidens. Thus Griese gives as a principal argument that the patient 
permanently on a respirator usually is totally incapable of breathing 
on his own, thus there might be no obligation to prolong the life of 
the patient. In tube feeding however, the alimentary system is not 
incapable of utilizing and benefitting from the artificial feeding: 
The alimentary system is still partially functional; the 
patient is still able to digest and assimilate food and fluid. 
The inoperative or dysfunctioning aspect of the alimentary 
system —that is, the incapacity to ingest and swallow 
nutrition and fluids— can be bypassed without excessive 
burden or pain so that digestion and assimilation can 
continue. When and where such an effective bypass 
mechanism is available, both as to installation and as to 
maintenance, there is a moral obligation to use that 
supplemental means so as to conserve the life of the indivi-
dual. . . . 1 1 3 
Thus because of this moral obligation, the lethal factor in the case 
of discontinuing an effective supplementalaid, should not be identified 
with the patient's existing and underlying fatal pathology, but with a 
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new and different pathological condition, which for PVS patients, 
could be starvation and dehydration, caused by deliberate denial of 
the staff of life: food and fluids. 
Moraczewski disagrees with the precisions made by Griese 
concerning supplemental and substitute means. He simply equates 
the use of artificial nutrition and hydration to that of a respirator, and 
thus concludes since one can determine the respirator to be an 
extraordinary means, similarly one can dispense with artificial nutrition 
and hydration with moral impunity, all other factors equal . 1 1 4 
Moraczewski also shares the opinion that unconscious life is not a 
benefit, and does not meet the criterion of spes salutis: 
Now for the difficult question: is it of benefit that a person 
be maintained alive in a permanent and profound comatose 
state?... What benefit is it to the irreversibly comatose patient 
to be maintained alive? There may be benefit to others, 
perhaps to society as a witness presumably to the dignity 
and the sanctity of life. But is it? True one may not kill the 
patient directly, one may not intend directly the patient's 
death. But if water and nutrition are removed from a patient, 
is this not a direct killing of the patient? No. Rather it is the 
concurrent pathology which prevents the patient from 
chewing and swallowing the food 1 1 5. 
Meilaender and Smith argue in favor of basic care in a common 
sense fashion. Meilaender maintains that to distinguish, for the 
permanently unconscious, between optional nutrition and hydration 
on the one hand, and mandatory hygienic care, such as routine 
positioning to prevent pressure sores and skin lesions, as envisioned 
by the President's Commission, on the other, does not seem to make 
sense. Both would seem to be covered under basic human dignity or 
fall together: «Yet it is hard to see why such services (turning the 
person regularly, giving alcohol rubs, and the like) are standard nursing 
care when feeding is not. Moreover, if feeding cannot benefit these 
patients, it is far from clear how they could experience bed sores as 
harm» . 1 1 6 This same objection is voiced by Smith. He rejects 
distinctions that see nutrition and hydration as distinct in importance 
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from pain control, skin care, personal hygiene, maintenance of 
comfortable room temperature, etc. He unveils the contradiction 
apparent in such passive euthanasia situations. «Does the fact that 
food and water (nutrition and hydration) is conveyed by a tube differ 
essentially from the fact that room temperature is also conveyed by 
artificial tubes and pipes?... If there is no objection to avoidable 
starvation by omission of tube feeding, what then is the objection to 
avoidable lethal pneumonia by turning off the artificially conveyed 
heat in a hospital room in Rhode Island in January? Indeed, in terms 
of time alone, the former (starvation) is a much, much slower death 
and dying than the latter, at least in January in Rhode Island*. 1 1 7 
Thus they contend, if these other items of care are considered 
proportionate and becoming of personal dignity, it would seem to 
follow that nutrition and hydration also ought to be considered 
obligatory. 
O'Rourke, however, speaks of the need for bodily life to grant 
benefits to the person: «Once again, the severity or lack of pain is not 
the determining factor in making the decision whether or not to 
prolong life. What we seek to assess when making this ethical decision 
is the burden that would result if life were prolonged, not the burden 
that the therapy used to prolong life would involve... Again we are 
called upon to assess the burden of prolonged life, not the burden 
intrinsic to the means to prolong life» 1 1 8. In the traditional teaching, 
the benefits and burdens are assessed from an analysis of the proposed 
means, as this would be the requirement for the traditional application 
of the principle of double effect. O'Rourke suggests that this 
assessment be extended also to the burden that a life would entail. 
This will raise a particular question: what is to be meant by the 
benefits, referred to in the category spessalutis, that should be gained? 
O'Rourke has decided against the proposition that human bodily life 
is one of these benefits. On the statement of bodily life as a good, 
O'Rourke writes: 
This statement is questionable on two grounds. First, is 
prolonging life in a persistent vegetative state 'a great benefit'? 
... The opinion of the AAN is that no benefit derives to the 
patient. Viewing the prolongation of life in a permanently 
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unconscious state as a 'great benefit' makes human life an 
absolute good, something clearly contrary to the Catholic 
teaching in regard to the prolongation of life 1 1 9 . 
As well, O'Rourke questions the value of mere bodily life when he 
brings up the issue of the benefits or burdens that must accrue to the 
others, namely family and society. He makes the point that even if 
one were to grant that the burden to the patient might be acceptable, 
the family could suffer sufficiently, over a long period, to amount to 
a sizeable burden. He remarks: «Would it be unreasonable to a loving 
person to consider it a severe burden to keep watch over and nurse a 
person in a permanently unconscious state? The burden to the family 
is more than financial. There is the psychic pain of seeing a loved one 
in a debilitated, unconscious condition from which he or she will not 
recover*.120 Thus, O'Rourke alludes to the Declaration on Euthanasia 
that specifically mentions that not only personal patient burdens are 
to be evaluated, but also those of the family and society. 
c) Effective and Useful Means 
After investigating the burdens and benefits of conserving life, a 
final section of applications debates the issue of whether means for 
patients are to be considered as medical treatment or as basic care, 
indispensable for all life. The former would fall under a certain 
autonomy, while the latter would seek to invoke a certain necessity or 
obligation. Connery argues for keeping the notions of medical 
treatment separate from basic care. Brodeur argues that making the 
distinction between treatments and care masks the issue of treating 
the patient in a dignified manner. O'Rourke, in the following section, 
gives his version of the role of effectiveness as an element to be 
incorporated into proportionality. 
John Connery provides responses in the «Quality of Life» vs. 
«Sanctity of Life* debate dealing with: the differences between feeding 
and treatment; the connection between means and cures; the proper 
use of the principle of double effect; and the scope of «Quality of 
Life* judgements. In this first issue, Connery makes the distinction 
between nutrition and hydration, and medical interventions: 
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There is clearly a difference between eating and drinking 
and medical treatment. Medical treatment is aimed at curing 
a disease. Eating and drinking are not aimed at curing disease, 
but at sustaining life. Medical treatment is therapeutic, eating 
and drinking are not basically therapeutic. So there is no 
doubt that eating and drinking, and medical treatment are 
two different procedures, although artificial feeding seems 
to be a combination of both 1 2 1 . 
The question remains if the difference between the two are morally 
relevant, that is, can we be held to always give food and water, and be 
limited in giving medical treatment? Given in the case of medical 
treatment, if the treatment is useless in curing the disease, it is not 
morally obligatory. But here the question is raised, since nutrition 
and hydration will not cure the disease either, can we forego it in the 
same manner? This is the position of O'Rourke. Here the difference 
between medical treatment and nutrition and hydration is accentuated. 
Thus speaking of the fact that useless means are not morally obliging, 
nemo ad inutile tenetur, Connery argues: 
Today, however, this principle is not properly used. It is 
used to free one from an obligation to use means if it would 
not cure disease. Thus, if a particular disease is irreversible, 
some would want to argue that it would be permissible to 
withdraw even nutrition and hydration, since they could 
not reverse the disease. But this ignores the whole meaning 
of the question, which is about the duty to prolong life, not 
the duty to cure disease 1 2 2. 
Thus it is argued that one cannot regard the medical means under 
the same aspect as nutrition and hydration, as they have different 
purposes. Obviously if feeding were to become futile, it would no 
longer be binding, as Connery makes clear: 
One cannot argue, as some would like, that a means could 
be judged useless if it did not cure the disease. Certainly, if 
some particular means would not prolong the patient's life, 
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it would be useless. But if feeding kept the patient alive 
indefinitely, it could not be considered useless even though it did 
not cure a particular disease. The whole sense of the question: 
Can a means be considered useless? has to do with preserving 
life. If it will preserve life, it is useful. One may judge that the 
life itself is useless and conclude that it is useless to prolong 
it. But this is a judgement about the uselessness of the life, 
not the uselessness of the means. The means remain useful to 
do what they always do: preserve life1^. 
Connery expounds clearly in his writings the role of intention in 
the correct use of the principle of double effect. For the intention 
would be one of the major factors in distinguishing a morally licit act 
from suicide or homicide. Respect for life never allows the latter two, 
which can happen in two ways: «(1) if death is the only immediate 
effect of some act or omission, or (2) if death is intended either as a 
means or an end». 1 2 4 Thus, if the act or intention does not fall into 
these defects, one can resolve morally the issue of treating and feeding: 
It would not be reasonable to demand that a patient accept 
one and not the other. Indeed foregoing either would be 
wrong, as pointed out above, if death was the only immediate 
effect, or if it was intended. The assumption is that neither 
is or has to be the case. Death is not the only immediate 
effect. If a means (treatment or feeding) is excessively 
burdensome, refusing treatment has another immediate 
effect —avoiding the burden of the treatment (or feeding). 
If this is what the patient intends, omitting eating and 
drinking could be justified as a legitimate application of the 
principle of double effect. He is not doing something wrong 
in itself, he does not intend the evil effect, and he avoids the 
burden which eating involves 1 2 5. 
Connery distinguishes those who use the traditional means approach 
from those who employ a «Quality of Life» ethic by the way they apply 
the principle of double effect. For ultimately those who sustain the quality 
of the patient as normative look beyond the immediate effect of medical 
treatments and other applications such as feeding. So Connery writes: 
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Some are looking not only at the means but also at the 
patient. They would like to distinguish between ordinary 
and extraordinary patients, as well as between ordinary and 
extraordinary means. The underlying reason is that they 
would like to make an allowance for extraordinary patients 
that would be independent of the allowance for extraordinary 
means. In other words, they would like to withdraw or 
withhold treatment on the basis of the quality of life of the 
patient as well as the quality of means. Thus, if the quality 
of life of the patient was below a certain standard, they would 
argue that the means of preserving life could be withheld or 
withdrawn even apart from any consideration of their burden 
or capability of prolonging life 1 2 6 . 
On the scope of «Quality of Life» judgements, Connery delimits 
the actuation of «Quality of Life» to the means only, excluding 
normative «Quality of Life» judgements about the lives of the 
individuals. The latter is of a different species for Connery, for in 
using a «Quality of Life» ethic: «One is entering into an entirely 
different category of moral act —intentionally bring on death». 1 2 7 
He explains this condition of limiting «Quality of Life» judgements 
only to the means: 
Quality of life can indeed be a legitimate consideration 
in judging moral obligations to preserve life, but only if it 
affects the means, i .e . , makes them useless or very 
burdensome. Thus if a person is actually dying, and death is 
imminent whether a certain means is used or not, such means 
will be useless. Or if a patient does not have full use of his 
senses, the defect can make a means to preserve life very 
burdensome. But if it does not make the means useless or 
burdensome, the quality of the patient's life will not remove 
the obligation to use the means. Thus, quality of life may 
not make antibiotics any more useless or more burdensome 
for the comatose than for the conscious 1 2 8. 
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Brodeur addresses the argument that states that there is a difference 
between treatments and care. He believes that such a difference does 
not confront the relation that exists between the patient's goals and 
values and his or her obligation to pursue life and to submit to medical 
treatments. The argument, it is asserted, does not take into account 
the goals of therapeutic interventions, and how these are related to 
the patient 1 2 9. Rather, such an argument is cast as forming a distinction 
of modality, medical or nursing, endowing this modality with moral 
significance. We can note, however, that this begs the question, the 
issue that Barry 1 3 0 and others point out, of whether such a thing as 
basic care can be established as proportionate for all those not 
imminently dying, and whether this basic care includes nutrition and 
hydration, taking into account the burdens of conveyance, cost, etc. 
3. The Spiritual Criterion 
a) The Proposition of O'Rourke 
One of the most vocal proponents of the teleological approach is 
Kevin O'Rourke. His innovative position begins by nuancing certain 
understandings. In the analysis of Walter, the arena of «Quality of 
Life» has now tended to shift away from evaluating substantial qualities 
to the teleologic posture of O'Rourke. Perhaps we can say that, through 
the teleologic approach, the impasse between the notion of «Quality 
of Life» and «Sanctity of Life» is in one way avoided, but contentions 
still exist in this newer stance, which involves the ability of debilitated 
persons to pursue the higher good, as we shall examine. Walter outright 
interprets the Declaration on Euthanasia as supporting this teleologic 
vision of the spiritual pursuit of life as a formal criterion for 
decisionmaking 1 3 1. 
In such dec is ionmaking , normally , the d is t inct ion of 
proportionality is conceived to apply to those who are imminently 
dying, those who will die within a short time regardless of medical 
intervention. An obligation is generally assumed to conserve the life 
of those who have complications that could result in death, but could 
be saved through routine application of apparently proportionate 
means, for example, insulin for diabetes. In a change of direction, 
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O'Rourke emphasizes the concept of fatal pathology as an element in 
the ethical analysis of life conservation. For those in a PVS, the fatal 
pathology is the inability to chew or swallow. From here, if the means 
to conserve life could be determined to be disproportionate for patients 
with such fatal pathology, nutrition and hydration could be withheld, 
allowing such pathology to run its course. It is important to note that 
O'Rourke intends the underlying pathology concept to be in concert 
with the Declaration on Euthanasia's ban on actions that have no other 
finality than to end life: since with the fatal pathology concept, the 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is meant not be a decision to 
directly terminate the life of the patient. 
O'Rourke also goes to the statements of Pius XII (Allocution of 
November 24, 1957) to found the basis for his statements on the 
obligation to support permanently unconscious bodily life. He 
emphasizes the remarks of the Pope about the importance of the higher 
good, and deduces the key criterion to be the ability to 'strive for life's 
purpose'. To measure up to this criterion, one clearly needs to be 
conscious and purposeful, and as such O'Rourke writes: 
Thus when the potential for the spiritual function is no 
longer present, then it seems that all treatment or care efforts 
which would sustain physiological function are ineffective. 
... Thus the goals of medicine and human life are not achieved 
if mere physiological function is prolonged while spiritual 
function is beyond the potential of the person. There is no 
attempt to prolong the life of anencephalic infants; why then 
prolong the life of people whose cerebral cortex will never 
again function? 1 3 2 
Thus, since bodily life alone, O'Rourke argues, does not allow 
that person to attain the goals of human life (the striving for life's 
purpose) nor the goals of medicine (presumably the cure or return to 
a relatively normal existence) means otherwise considered ordinary 
or useful are not obligatory. Thus the previous criteria of usefulness is 
enlarged to become effectiveness for promoting or regaining the spiritual 
junction. Thus while nutrition and hydration could be considered 
useful in the sense that they conserve bodily life, they cannot however 
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be considered effective for a PVS patient in that they are not a resource 
for achieving spiritual function: all treatment for PVS patients is 
ineffective, and no treatment in particular is thus binding. Thus 
O'Rourke puts in relief the necessity of a functioning cerebrum: 
Because the mind is necessary for spiritual function, at 
least the potential for cognitive-affective function in some 
degree must be present to justify sustaining physiological 
function. If the cognitive-affective potential is nonexistent, 
the person is still a human being, but a human being toward 
whom we do not have an ethical obligation to prolong life 1 3 3. 
O'Rourke concludes what the result of this determination would 
have on this class of individuals: 
In order to pursue the purpose of life, one needs some 
degree of cognitive-affective function.... Hence, if efforts to 
restore cognitive-affective function can be judged useless, or 
it can be judged that an infant will never develop cognitive-
affective function, then if a fatal pathology is present, the 
adult or infant may be allowed to die. ... This is the precise 
ethical justification for discontinuing artificial hydration and 
nutrition for people in an irreversible coma, not the fact 
'that benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens', as the 
A.M.A. statement seems to indicate 1 3 4 . 
Thus, the duty of physicians, family members and society is 
substantially altered. For those with an intact potential or actual 
functioning cerebrum, the duty remains unaltered. But for those 
without such abilities, means before considered proportionate and 
obligatory, now are to be deemed useless, not because they do not 
sustain the person physiologically, but because of their ineffectiveness 
in supporting or restoring the patient to the pursuit of spiritual goals. 
The duty to provide life-support no longer binds anyone. 
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b) Criticisms of the Spiritual Criterion 
The stance of O'Rourke is not only novel in its interpretation of 
the words of Pius XII, but also in its consideration of the 
proportionality of life in, say, a PVS. Not all agree with O'Rourke's 
position. Quay and Connery fundamentally disagree with the 
interpretation made of the papal statement on means. Griese and 
Cronin add to this objection and take issue with the O'Rourke's notion 
of life that does not merit nutrition and hydration when this does not 
involve a moral impossibility. Ashley argues, in similar fashion to 
O'Rourke, in favor a teleologic interpretation. Likewise, Brodeur 
strongly supports the position of O'Rourke, and offers nuanced 
arguments in its favor. 
In their opposition to the teleologic proposal of O'Rourke, Paul 
Quay and John Connery do not see a connection between the 
concession to dispense with means that interfere with the higher good, 
(a means that could be thus extraordinary or not proportionate to 
one's ultimate end), and the peculiar condition presented by a PVS 
patient. Quay writes: 
The obvious fallacy lies in the shift from the freedom to 
dispense with means that would interfere with the spiritual 
to the freedom to dispense with the life that is interfered 
with. The conscious patient whose spiritual or other higher 
good would be put at hazard by an excessively burdensome 
treatment is made equivalent to a permanently demented 
or unconscious patient whose higher goods cannot be 
obstructed by any conceivable means of treatment, already 
being blocked by disease. The competent patient chooses 
the higher good, though realizing death is likely to ensue as 
a result. The non-competent patient has death chosen for 
him as the means to prevent his remaining longer in his 
diseased condition 1 3 5 
While conceding that the permanently unconscious and their 
families have a difficult lot, he suggests that the dignity and sacredness 
of the human person calls for treatment when it is useful for conserving 
life, and can be provided without excessive burden. 
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John Connery, following Quays posture 1 3 6, recalls the context in 
which the comments of Pius XII (Allocution of November 24, 1957) 
were made in order to obtain a proper interpretation. Such context 
bespoke the obligation of using certain means. The duty thus concerned 
the quality of means, not the «Quality of Life»: «Pius XII put this in 
part, in terms of interfering with a higher good. He said that it would 
be permissible to forego means to preserve life because making them 
obligatory would interfere with a higher good. In other words, pursuing 
life or health with some particular means could become optional if 
some higher good is at stake. Such means would become 
extraordinary».1 3 7 Thus nutrition and hydration is not an obstacle to 
the higher good; it is not something to be removed that might prevent 
such a pursuit. For the PVS patient, it is no obstacle at all. 
Griese argues against the teleologic posture of O'Rourke first by 
pointing out what he sees as a fatal flaw: the introduction of a dualistic 
anthropological vision of man: «No form of dualism is rationally 
defensible. For every dualism sets out to be a theory of one's personal 
identity as a unitary and subsisting self —a self always organically 
living, but only discontinuously conscious, and now and then 
inquiring, choice-making, and using means to achieve purposes. But 
every form of dualism renders inexplicable the unity in complexity 
which we experience in every conscious act. ... Therefore contrary to 
what O'Rourke, McCormick, and others think, human life is 
inherently good, so it does not cease to be good when one no longer 
can enjoy a degree of cognitive-affective function or attain other 
valúes» 1 3 8 ' 
By equally reverting to the original statements of Pope Pius. His 
comments on the interpretation of the words of Pius XII (Allocution 
of November 24, 1957) reveal an appeal to the context of the document: 
Some authors interpret these words of Pius XII as 
justification for withdrawing tube feeding from a terminal 
patient as a step in the pursuit of the 'spiritual purpose of 
life'. First of all, such an interpretation clearly is out of 
context. Even authors who may consider tube feeding to be 
a medical treatment should admit, from a cursory reading of 
the address, that the Holy Father was not referring to the 
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obligation to provide sustenance. He was speaking of medical 
treatments... 1 3 9 
Griese continues by noting that these words of Pius XII taken 
together with the Declaration on Euthanasia, form a whole. It is not 
all that apparent in either document that nutrition and hydration 
could be considered distinct from the ordinary care which must never 
be interrupted 1 4 0. He points out the difference between conserving 
life and prolonging life: conservation of life requires food and water, 
that necessary for all life. He alludes to Cronin's comments on this 
teleological importance of conservation of life as distinct to the 
prolongation of life: 
The dictate of the natural law that requires a man to con-
serve his own life is a serious one. It is based on the double 
importance of man's human life. His life is important as a 
divine gift over which God retains the ultimate dominion. 
Secondly, it is important as the means whereby man can 
merit his eternal salvation. Hence, self conservation is no 
mere heroic act, which although laudable, is not obligatory. 
The conservation of one's own life is not just a desirable 
thing which entails no serious duty. In reality, the natural 
law imposes self conservation as a very definite obligation 
from which the individual is excused only when such 
conservation is impossible for him either physically or 
morally 1 4 1 . 
Cronin finds a balance in Aquinas where the prohibition against 
suicide on one hand is opposed to the disorder of an over-anxious 
concern for living and an undue love for life preserving measures on 
the other. Aquinas speaks of a due measure (debitoproprio)142. It would 
seem that Pius XII's remarks (Allocution of November 24, 1957) 
captured this sense, and were meant to keep a man from subordinating 
his supernatural end to a 'natural' end. Such subordination would be 
an attempt to live one's earthly life while marginalizing one's 
supernatural life. One can ask: is life in a PVS detrimental to one's 
supernatural life? One could, however, strive for an long life, at the 
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cost of ones duties to others and act,as it were, in opposition to faith 
in the resurrection. There is a clinging to this earthly life that does 
damage one's supernatural life. This interpretation of Pope Pius XII's 
words follows the context of his address, uttered several decades ago 
in answer to pressing questions on resuscitation. The «teleological» 
interpretation of Pius XII's words, made by O'Rourke and others, is 
not rejected by the very text itself. But as a developed criterion, the 
teleological approach is clearly a particular interpretation and 
extension, and not a mere restatement, and even appears to be taken 
out of context. 
Benedict Ashley, for his part, supports O'Rourke in the teleologic 
position. In a work on the intrinsic teleology of the human body as 
normative, he addresses the significance of human life that has lost 
the capacity for cognitive-affective function, and opines that the 
obligation to preserve life in such a condition is minimal 1 4 3 . «To argue, 
as some do, that intravenous nutrition and hydration are always 
ordinary and obligatory if they are necessary to maintain life, on the 
grounds that to discontinue them is to kill the patient, or because 
life, even in this condition, is still an inestimable value outweighing 
most burdens of care, is to forget that the obligation to take means to 
preserve life diminishes as the value of this life, measured in terms of 
its intrinsic teleology, diminishes. Human bodily life by its intrinsic 
teleology has its value from its service to activities of the whole human 
person, and especially those activities which are specifically human, 
the spiritual activities of knowledge and free choice. When these 
activities become permanently more and more difficult or impossible, 
the corresponding obligation to preserve bodily life diminishes. ... 
Thus in this case as in all ethical dilemmas arising from technology 
the important thing is to establish intrinsic teleology as the ultimate 
measure of morality. This principle, philosophically coherent with 
empirical science, is theologically confirmed by the biblical teaching 
that God has created us in his image and given us a stewardship over 
his creation, a stewardship to be exercised creatively and harmoniously 
within the Creator's general purposes». 
This author does not see the jump from teleology as an ethical 
principle to the conclusion that the obligation diminishes toward that 
life as its spiritual powers diminish, even less how one could be 
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obligated to less than ordinary means, —and by what proportion 
would it diminish? "Where the body is, there is the person; and the 
embodied person has value in that God loves him. To see the value of 
the embodied person, or in the value of the body for the person only 
in terms of its ability to know and love God is to miss out on the 
other half. 
Brodeur presents, in a summary way, the conflicting views of many 
authors on the duty to feed PVS patients, and concludes: «Resolution 
of these issues depends upon agreement on the facts of the medical 
description of a PVS, the ability to distinguish PVS patients from 
persons who are severely mentally retarded and other mentally 
incapacitated individuals, and the need to develop a consensus about 
methods and time frames to diagnose a patient in a PVS. These 
concerns must be correlated with a patient's values, purpose of life, 
and other ethical principies» 1 4 4. 
In order to give a firm basis to the teleologic theory, the preceding 
authors, especially Brodeur, who argue in favor of its adoption have 
marked out, for practical cases, PVS and anencephalic patients as in-
disputable examples of individuals with fatal pathologies who are not 
able «to strive for life's purpose». Given that such claims have life or 
death implications, it is fitting to examine whether the teleologic 
position can rightly lay claim to such a firm starting point. 
Given the importance of the cognitive-affective function in eliciting 
moral acts, these ethicists have maintained that anencephalic and PVS 
patients provide clear cut cases of where a line can be drawn regarding 
nuancing obligations to provide otherwise proportionate care; the 
former would never attain cognitive-affective function, while the latter 
have definitively lost it. Prudence would dictate caution with this 
approach. It is difficult, from a philosophical view, to know in a 
definitive manner, the subjective situation of the person with extensive 
brain damage, outside of complete and sustained electro-cerebral 
silence or definitive death 1 4 5 . Also from a physician's position, the 
diagnoses of anencephaly and PVS are not without their complications. 
Shewmon shows the complexity of many aspects of anencephaly: «If 
anencephaly were clearly distinct from all other congenital brain 
deformations, it should be possible to give an operational definition of 
it that includes all cases of anencephaly and excludes all cases of everything 
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else, yet such a definition has not been offered by anyone so far» 1 4 6. For 
adults with a presumed PVS, he advises caution, suggesting at least a 
two month observation period before offering diagnosis. He examines 
the clinical guidelines for PVS determination, and analyzes several cases 
of a PVS, including emergence from PVS 1 4 7 . Recovery from a supposed 
PVS does not always indicate initial misdiagnosis148. 
Besides the precisions that Shewmon makes, there exists another 
contribution that ought to be considered in respect to the viability of 
the teleological approach. May takes exception, and exchanges with 
O'Rourke's sharp criticism concerning the practice that such an 
approach would set in motion. He responds to the position of 
O'Rourke seeking to bring out the logical consequences of his position. 
O'Rourke has presented the case for those lacking all capacity for 
consciousness, discerning a «patent» disvalue and burden of mere 
human bodily life. May, however, asks about those who do retain 
some cogitative capacity, although much reduced. O'Rourke has 
regarded these as worthy of protection, but it is not clear that by his 
own criteria they would escape the fate of those who lack all cogitative 
capacity. Thus May charges: 
Many people, including some seriously handicapped 
children and some elderly people who are not 'with it' persons 
who are not actually able to judge the truth or falsity of 
propositions or make free choices, are not capable of striving 
for the 'spiritual purpose' of life. They cannot do so because, 
in order to do so, a person must be able to make judgements 
and to make free choices. But these unfortunate human 
beings are still persons; their lives are still good, and it is 
good for them to be alive 1 4 9. 
The beginnings are small as May indicates: «Most of the cases that 
have attracted attention thus far have involved the severely brain 
damaged —those who are permanently unconscious, severely damaged 
by strokes, in advanced stages of dementia due to Alzheimers's or 
other disease, and so on. But the various sorts of damage, defect, 
debility, and handicap that burden human lives occur in myriad 
degrees, so that there are always more and less severe cases differing 
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from one another only by degree* 1 5 0. But the necessary conclusion is 
forceful: 
Countless severely handicapped persons, including infants 
and the elderly, are regarded as worthless. There are many 
such persons who are no longer capable or will never be 
capable of'reaching life's spiritual goals' or of'realizing life's 
purposes'. They are not capable of doing so because they 
cannot engage in human acts, i.e., acts proceeding from the 
person with deliberation and choice. They are not moral 
agents. But, I submit, they are still beings of moral worth, i.e., 
persons, whose lives are irreplaceably precious and worthy 
of our respect and love. To deny these persons treatment on 
the grounds that treatment will not help them to realize 
life's purposes is grossly unjust and unfair. It surely cannot 
be what Pius XII meant 1 5 1 . 
May makes the point that neither are these, with lesser degrees of 
cerebral capacity, whom already O'Rourke has defended as worthy of 
life prolongation, able to «pursue life's purpose*. By what basis, then, 
should these be accorded protection? Certainly still there are few 
bioethicists who would favor abandoning all those who are effectively 
unable to «pursue life's purpose*. This would become evident when 
the necessity of treatment presents itself for these. What one normally 
might judge to be ordinary treatments should also be obligatory for 
them. «Yet, on O'Rourke's analysis, they would not, for they would 
not be effective in helping this person to 'strive for the spiritual purpose 
of life'* 1 5 2. 
In a response to May, O'Rourke maintains that for those with 
diminished mental capacity, there still remain obligations to provide 
nutrition and hydration: 
If a fatal pathology is not present, whether in the person 
who is mentally competent or in the person who is mentally 
disabled, then nutrition and hydration should be provided 
by others if one cannot provide these goods of life for oneself. 
To put it in another way, we have a positive responsibility to 
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prolong our own lives and the lives of others who are 
dependent upon us as long as our efforts to help another 
person are beneficial. Only when one's own life or the life of 
a loved one in our care is threatened by a fatal pathology do 
we have a moral right to ask the questions: Will attempts to 
remove or circumvent this pathology be effective or ineffective? 
Will attempts to circumvent or remove this pathology result 
in greater burden than benefit for the patient? 1 5 3 
We can ponder, however, just how this protects from the slippery 
slope. How it is not the very entry to the slippery slope itself is not so 
clear 1 5 4 . The standard of «the pursuit of life's purposes*, would 
effectively lessen much of the obligation to conserve the lives of those 
in these states. It appears, however, to be a mere definitional barrier, 
given that those with some cognitive ability should not be evaluated 
in this way, when practically speaking, many do not have any more 
significant hope of «striving for the purpose of life», than those 
correctly diagnosed as PVS patients. 
But, we can see that there is a wide range of mental disorders that, 
like a PVS, would preclude a person from the ability to seek life's 
purpose, that is, from the minimum cognitive affective level necessary 
for moral acts. Thus rather than being an admonition of slippery 
slope, it appears to be a logical conclusion that the requirement of 
ability of «seeking life's purpose* for PVS patients puts other 
handicapped persons in danger. The rebuttal provided by O'Rourke 
does not reply adequately to this charge. The cited article speaks, in 
reply to May, of the fatal pathology of chewing and swallowing for a 
PVS patient as a clearly demarcated case, but does not treat the logic 
that shows his interpretation is still open to the original charge. For 
there is a large population of retarded and demented persons in 
treatment centers which cannot perform human acts. What if such 
persons, for example, acquire an infection, easily cleared up by sim-
ple application of cheap and readily available antibiotics, but if left 
untreated, constitutes a fatal pathology. Is it not in effect relativizing 
by the condition of the patient, all means considered proportionate 
or obligatory by Pope Pius and by the Congregation? As a case in 
point, Claire Conroy was neither 'brain dead', nor comatose, nor in a 
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PVS state when a court order authorized removal of her gastrostomy 
tube 1 5 5 . The term «useless» is not completely synonymous with 
«ineffective», and constitutes an addition not easily derives from the 
original words of the Pope. It appears that too much hinges on the 
interpretation of the Pope's words, which were uttered for the purpose 
of clarifying the extraordinary means of respirator use. 
4. Resolution 
If the preceding notion of the relativizing of means can be sustained, 
then truly a clear «Quality of Life» element is able to be derived. The 
obligation to use a particular means is seen already as dependent on 
the condition of the patient, in that the condition is part of the 
determinant of the burdensomeness or usefulness of proposed 
treatment. This new nuance would also allow one to forego means, 
not burdensome nor useless, in view of a better forthcoming death. 
The principle of double effect requires an indirect intention. But the 
omission of means which do not involve a moral impossibility, and 
by whose omission death directly follows, does not fulfil this condition. 
This question has merit in that it directs one to examine the illnesses 
not as just separable parts, each with its ordinary cure, but also toward 
examining the sickness in the light of all the attendant circumstances 
taken as a the whole. A key circumstance is the determination of the 
content of parum pro nihil reputatur. If a given treatment allows 
prolongation of life but for a brief period, there is no obligation to 
employ it. Authors usually express imminent death as that to occur 
within hours. How far beyond imminent death does the principle 
extend? If the time to be lived is substantial, then the distinct elements 
might indeed be separable, and it would be an error to lump them 
together, or to concede relativity to ordinary means where none exists. 
Thus , where two or more pathologica l diseases occur 
simultaneously, the following conditions ought to be taken into 
account in determining the proportionality of means: 1. if one or 
more, or the whole of them provoke medical futility (uselessness); 2. 
if an illness comes to cause a moral impossibility (burdensomeness), 
then the others can be foregone, provided that the latter ones do not 
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introduce the cause of death by their omission (suapta natura); 3. if 
the time of life gained is quite small, hours or a day or so (parum pro 
nihil reputatur); 4. if the person is spiritually prepared, or does not 
have obligations in justice to fulfil (eliminating a per accidens 
requirement to use disproportionate means); 5. if the aggregate of 
the means, considered separately as proportionate, once summed up 
in the light of their whole, are considered disproportionate (where 
the treatment in the light of the whole is summed as excessively 
burdensome). What is assumed is that the cures, considered separately 
would be proportionate, the other illnesses being absent as applied. 
The case presented earlier, of diabetes and cancer with a six month 
prognosis for death does not appear to exhibit the exempt 
characteristics. The insulin treatment could be foregone only in the 
face of imminent death from the cancer. 
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